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DID ANYONE ASK THE CHILD?: RECOGNIZING FOSTER
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS TO MAKE MATURE DECISIONS
THROUGH CHILD-CENTERED REPRESENTATION†
ABSTRACT
A child placed in foster care finds themselves in an especially vulnerable
position. Removed from their homes, apart from family, and living with
strangers, a foster child’s voice often gets lost in the shuffle. While the Supreme
Court has recognized some constitutional rights for children, legislators and
judges tread lightly when expanding children’s rights for fear of infringing upon
parents’ fundamental rights to determine the care and upbringing of their
children. This situation creates a unique disadvantage for a child in foster care
who is subject to the trauma of removal, placement in a temporary home of
strangers, outside the bounds of parental protection, and often without a voice
or an advocate.
This Comment focuses on the plight of foster children in America’s legal
system and how children’s lack of decision-making authority leaves their rights
under-protected. Through analysis of prominent Supreme Court cases
discussing parents’, children’s, and foster parents’ rights, and an examination
of state and federal foster care legislation, this Comment argues that the foster
child often falls through the gaps among parents, foster parents, and state
officials, none of whom exercise full authority over the child. Moreover, the
Court’s justification for its failure to grant children the full spectrum of rights
rests largely on the premise that the child is cared for by a fit, loving parent who
acts in the child’s best interests. However, for the child in foster care, this
premise is flawed from the start. The foster child is not in the custody of their
legal parent.
This Comment argues that courts must adopt and expand the mature minor
doctrine to provide a framework for entertaining and assessing the foster child’s
ability to make rational, informed decisions about their own life. Moreover,
states must amend their statutory child welfare schemes to guarantee children
in foster care the right to an attorney, and, specifically, an attorney who
advocates for the child’s expressed wishes throughout the child’s time in foster
care. Through these measures, states can return some of the continuity that
†
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children in foster care have lost by allowing the children themselves to have a
voice.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 17, 2021, the Supreme Court decided its second major case
concerning the foster care system.1 Despite the Court’s careful contemplation of
the rights attendant to parties on both sides of the litigation, one consideration
remained notably absent from the Court’s determination: the interests of the
foster child. In Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, the Court considered whether a
religious foster care agency contracting with the City of Philadelphia could
discriminate against prospective foster parents on the basis of a couple’s sexual
orientation.2 The Court unanimously concluded that the City’s refusal to contract
with the religious foster care agency violated the agency’s First Amendment
rights.3 However, as is often the case with state involvement in the lives of
children, the Court carefully deliberated the constitutional rights of the adult
parties without more than a mere nod to what rights and interests the foster
children themselves might have in the situation when, arguably, they were the
most affected party.4
This Comment explores the rights of the foster care child against the
backdrop of the children’s rights movement, focusing on how the broader debate
surrounding children’s rights intersects with the specific needs of the child in
foster care. This Comment argues that more active, decision-making rights must
be afforded to children in foster care to truly facilitate the best interests of the
child. The current state of the foster care system fails to adequately protect the
rights of children, demanding a more child-centered solution.
This Comment proceeds in five parts. Part I provides an overview of the
rights of legal parents, the State, and foster parents as they currently stand,
discussing how the fractured legal oversight granted to each of these parties
creates what this Comment calls the “rights gap” in the life of the foster child.
Part II outlines the constitutional rights of children both inside and outside of
state custody, specifically via analysis of the landmark Supreme Court cases that
have recognized and limited the rights of children. Secondly, it explores the

1
See
U.S.
Supreme
Court:
Adoption,
Foster
Care,
ABA,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/child_law/resources/case-law/u-s—supreme-court/
(compiling a list of landmark Supreme Court cases relating to children, adoption, and foster care and noting only
one case relating directly to the rights of key stakeholders in the foster care system); Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021). The first major Supreme Court case covering the foster care system was
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform. 431 U.S. 816, 816–17 (1977).
2 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1882.
3 Id. at 1874, 1882. The Court’s analysis primarily rested on whether the City’s laws were permissible
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Id. at 1874.
4 See generally id. at 1878–82.
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origins and mechanics of the mature minor doctrine. Part III examines how
federal and state foster care legislation expand and interpret the rights of the
foster child. It then argues that the rights of foster children primarily fall into
two categories—what this Comment dubs “passive” rights and “active” rights—
asserting that children in foster care are granted the former under most state
statutory schemes but denied the latter.
Part IV proposes a two-part solution that increases the protection of rights
for children in foster care. First, juvenile and state courts must implement and
expand the mature minor doctrine as a framework for deferring to the wishes of
the child, relying on a child’s age, maturity, and moral agency to determine the
level of deference that should be afforded to the child’s wishes. Second, states
must mandate legal representation for foster children in all judicial or quasijudicial actions in the form of a child-centered attorney who represents the
express wishes, rather than best interests, of the child. Finally, Part V addresses
the implications of the two-part solution advocated in Part IV.
I. THREE’S A CROWD: THE RIGHTS OF LEGAL PARENTS AND FOSTER
PARENTS, AND THE POWERS OF THE STATE
This Part provides an overview of the rights of key figures in the foster
child’s life: the legal parent, the State, and the foster parent. First, this Part
discusses the mechanics of the foster care system and how it works. Second, it
examines Supreme Court cases establishing and defining parental rights
governing the upbringing and care of the child. Third, it explores the power of
the state to intervene in the parent-child relationship, analyzing what
countervailing interests allow the state to remove a child from the custody of
their legal parents. Fourth, it examines the rights of the foster parent, primarily
exploring a sampling of state laws and the Court’s 1977 holding in Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (O.F.F.E.R.)5 as a
basis for defining the outer limitations of the foster parent’s rights. Finally, it
argues that these three parties fail to provide adequate protection for the rights
of the foster child due to the incomplete set of rights held by each individual
party.

5

Smith, 431 U.S. at 855–56.
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A. The Foster Care System: An Overview
On any given day in the United States, there are over 400,000 children in
foster care.6 A child enters foster care for a variety of reasons, including
voluntary surrender of the child by the parents; death or incarceration of the
child’s parents; or the determination of parental unfitness due to abuse or
neglect.7 In these situations, the state assumes temporary care of the child until
they can be reunited with the parent or the state elects to terminate the parent’s
rights to the child, making them eligible for adoption.8 During this interim
period, the state assumes legal custody of the child, but often transfers physical
custody to a foster care agency, which then places the child in a temporary living
situation with foster parents or—in an increasingly rare number of cases—a
group home or institutional care.9
As many as 6% of children in the United States will enter the foster care
system before they turn eighteen, and the federal government alone spends
approximately $5 billion a year to reimburse states for foster care expenditures. 10
Despite foster care’s massive size and the high volume of children continuously
entering and exiting the system, the standard of care within the foster care system
varies significantly among different homes and caretaking facilities. 11
Moreover, although there have been numerous efforts to reform the foster care
6 ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES : CHILD.’S BUREAU, THE AFCARS REPORT 1 (2020),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cb/afcarsreport28.pdf [hereinafter ADMIN. FOR CHILD. &
FAMILIES: C HILD.’S BUREAU, THE AFCARS REPORT] (reporting that on September 30 of each fiscal year
spanning from 2016 to 2020, there was an average of 427,096 children in the United States’ foster care system).
7 Matthew R. Asman, The Rights of a Foster Parent Versus the Biological Parent Who Abandoned the
Child: Where Do the Best Interests of the Child Lie?, 8 CONN. PROB. L.J. 93, 106 (1993); see Foster Care
Explained: What It Is, How It Works, and How It Can Be Improved, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND. (May 20, 2022),
https://www.aecf.org/blog/what-is-foster-care.
8 GA.
DEP’T
HUM.
SERVS.,
FOSTER
CARE
IN
GEORGIA
1,
https://dhs.georgia.gov/sites/dhs.georgia.gov/files/DFCS.Foster%20Care.5.12.pdf (explaining most children in
foster care return to their families, while others are adopted or stay in the system for long-term care).
9 Mark C. Fleegle, Smith v. Org. Foster Fams. for Equality & Reform: Adequacy of Procedures to Protect
Whatever Liberty Interest Foster Families May Have, 5 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 513, 514 (1978); Child Welfare Info.
Gateway, Group and Residential Care, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES,
https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/outofhome/group-residential-care/ (noting the Federal Family First
Prevention Services Act’s preference for family foster homes over group homes).
10 Kristin Turney & Christopher Wildeman, Mental and Physical Health of Children in Foster Care, 138
PEDIATRICS 5 (2016); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., FEDERAL FOSTER CARE F INANCING: HOW AND WHY
THE CURRENT FUNDING STRUCTURE FAILS TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE C HILD WELFARE FIELD 1 (2005),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/migrated_legacy_files//138206/ib.pdf.
11 Teresa Wiltz, Finding Foster Families for Teens is a Challenge in Many States, PEW CHARITABLE TRS.
(June 20, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/06/20/finding-fosterfamilies-for-teens-is-a-challenge-in-many-states (discussing the difficulty of finding foster families for teens,
particularly after the Family First Prevention Services Act placed stringent restrictions on children’s stays in
congregate care facilities, or “group homes”).
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system throughout the past fifty years,12 deep fractures still remain, with racial
and ethnic disparities,13 overburdened caseloads,14 and continual reports of
abuse,15 leaving children vulnerable to the very kinds of ills the system is
designed to prevent.16
Despite the numerous strains17 already burdening America’s child welfare
efforts, the plight of foster children is often exacerbated by their inability to
advocate for their own rights amidst a network of other actors. 18 The framework
of children’s constitutional rights in America rests on a presumption that the
child has a parent or a competent guardian making decisions for them in a way
that shields them from harm and neglect.19 However, in the case of the foster
child, this framework is often flawed from the start, since many children enter
the system due to a finding of abuse or neglect by the child’s legal parent(s). 20
In these situations, the parent21 often retains some measure of legal rights over
12

Michael S. Wald, New Directions for Foster Care Reform, 68 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 7, 10 fig. 1 (2017).
See Tanya Asim Cooper, Racial Bias in American Foster Care: The National Debate, 97 MARQ. L. REV.
215, 217–18 (2013) (discussing the disproportionately high numbers of Native American and black children in
America’s foster care system).
14 Sandra Stukes Chipungu & Tricia B. Bent-Goodley, Meeting the Challenges of Contemporary Foster
Care, 14 CHILD., FAMS., & FOSTER CARE 74, 77 (2004) (identifying overburdened caseloads and high staff
turnover as “major” problems in the child welfare system).
15 See, e.g., Josh Salman, Daphne Chen & Pat Beall, Foster Kids Lived with Molesters. No One Told Their
Parents.,
USA
TODAY
(Oct.
16,
2020,
2:42
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/indepth/news/investigations/2020/10/15/no-one-checks-on-kids-who-previously-lived-with-abusive-fosterparents/5896724002/; Michael Wilson, Ashley Southall & Chelsia Rose Marcius, At Birth, She Already Had a
Case File. At 7 Years Old, She Was Dead, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/30/nyregion/childdead-foster-care.html (commenting on the failures of the New York foster care system to detect abuse and
neglect in the case of Julissia Batties, a seven-year-old girl in and out of the New York foster care system
throughout her life who was tragically beaten to death).
16 See, e.g., Wald, supra note 12, at 8 (enumerating the many issues with the foster care system in America,
including “instability, impermanence, and the uneven quality of care”).
17 See, e.g., Dale Margolin Cecka, The Civil Rights of Sexually Exploited Youth in Foster Care, 117 W.
VA. L. REV. 1225, 1227 (2015) (“[W]ell-documented challenges in the child welfare system[] . . . include[] ‘poor
monitoring[;] . . . inadequate policies, training, and supervision; lack of effective decision making tools and
safety assessment protocols; and poor tracking systems, along with high caseloads that limit the time available
for visiting with families.’” (citation omitted)); Eve Stotland & Cynthia Godsoe, The Legal Status of Pregnant
and Parenting Youth in Foster Care, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 2–3 (2006) (discussing the “legal
conundrum” of pregnant and parenting youth in foster care, who often lack rights over their own lives, but
maintain a responsibility to govern the care and upbringing of their children).
18 See Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Constitutional Rights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2099, 2171 (2011).
19 Id. at 2101.
20 Foster Care Explained: What It Is, How It Works, and How It Can Be Improved, ANNIE E. CASEY
FOUND. (May 20, 2022), https://www.aecf.org/blog/what-is-foster-care.
21 While the term “parent” is often used broadly to encompass both legal and biological parentage, these
concepts are not necessarily synonymous in the law. For instance, Georgia law defines “biological father” as “a
male who impregnated the biological mother resulting in the birth of the child.” GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-1(2)–
(3) (2018). By contrast, Georgia law defines “legal father” to encompass a man who “[h]as legally adopted such
13
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the child,22 since the ultimate goal in most cases is to eventually reunite the child
and legal parent, if possible.23 When a child is in state custody, the state steps
into the child’s life to exercise a greater degree of legal control than it otherwise
would.24 In this period, key decisions in a child’s life are divided between state
officials and the child’s legal parent, parties that are often at odds with one
another due to the contentious nature of state-initiated child removal.25
In addition to the complex relationship between the state and a child’s legal
parent, the foster parent, as temporary custodian, also plays a role in the foster
child’s life. This party adds another stakeholder with the ability to make daily
decisions on behalf of the child,26 but without the same panoply of rights as the
child; [w]as married to the biological mother of such child . . . within the usual period of gestation, unless
paternity was disproved . . . or [h]as legitimated such child.” GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-1(11) (2018). This
Comment will primarily use the terminology of “legal parent,” not to the exclusion of biological parentage, but
also not necessitating a biological connection between parent and child.
22 CASA: COURT APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN, WHEN YOUR CHILD IS IN FOSTER
CARE:
A
HANDBOOK
FOR
PARENTS
AND
GUARDIANS
1,
https://fopjc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/08/Parent_Guardian-Handbook181.pdf (“As the parent or guardian of a child in foster
care, you have the right to: [k]now the reason your child was removed[,] [k]now and understand what you must
do to have your child returned to you[,] [b]e represented by an attorney[,] [b]e notified of the date and time of
all court hearings[,] . . . [and] [r]eceive updates from your social worker on your child’s health, development,
behavior and progress in school.”).
23 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B) (“[T]he status of each child is reviewed periodically but no less frequently than
once every six months by either a court or by administrative review . . . to determine . . . the continuing necessity
for and appropriateness of the placement, the extent of compliance with the case plan, and the extent of progress
which has been made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement in foster care, and to
project a likely date by which the child may be returned to and safely maintained in the home . . . .”); see Zach
Strassburger, Medical Decision Making for Youth in the Foster Care System, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1103,
1142–43 (2016) (noting that a majority of children who enter the foster care system are eventually reunited with
their legal parents, with over 75% of reunifications occurring within the first year of a child’s placement in foster
care).
24 Compare DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 189–190 (1989) (holding that
the state has no duty to protect children who are not within its physical custody), with Laura A. Harper, The
State’s Duty to Children in Foster Care—Bearing the Burden of Protecting Children, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 793,
795 (2003) (explaining that, upon a finding of abuse or neglect, a government “agency may obtain a court order
[to remove] the abused child from his or her home” and into the custody of the state).
25 Kendra Huard Fershee, The Parent Trap: The Unconstitutional Practice of Severing Parental Rights
Without Due Process of Law, 30 GA. STATE UNIV. L. REV. 639, 649 (2014) (describing the advent of an
“adversarial” relationship between courts and parents deemed to be unfit in the mid-to-late-1800s when courts
began involving themselves in situations of child abuse, and noting the continuance of this “struggle” in the
modern child custody context); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759–60 (1982) (“[T]he fact-finding hearing
pits the State directly against the parents. The State alleges that the natural parents are at fault. . . . Victory by
the State not only makes termination of parental rights possible; it entails a judicial determination that the parents
are unfit to raise their own children.”).
26 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-281(a) (2019) (enumerating a number of rights held by foster parents,
including: the right to participate in planning a foster child’s visitation with his or her biological parent, the right
to be considered as a preferential placement when a child who was formerly under the foster parent’s care
reenters the foster system, and the right to be considered as the first choice of permanent placement for a child
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fit legal parent.27 It is against this complicated landscape that the foster child’s
rights are often inadequately represented, as the child struggles to find their
voice and express their views amidst a host of other parties that often maintain
competing interests and disagree on what outcomes appropriately serve the
“‘best interests’ of the child.”28
B. Constitutional Rights of the Parent
The rights of parents are well-established in American jurisprudence.29 In
1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court first recognized the substantive due
process rights of parents to “establish a home and bring up children.”30 In Meyer,
the Court held that a Nebraska law restricting the teaching of foreign languages
was an unconstitutional violation of the “liberty” guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.31 The Court in Meyer explicitly recognized “the natural duty of the
parent to give his children education,” expanding the liberty interest violated by
the Nebraska law to protect the family unit’s right to autonomy.32 This nod to
parental rights laid the groundwork for later cases to build on the idea of the
who goes up for adoption and has lived with the foster parent for more than twelve months); DEP’T HUM. SERVS.
ONLINE DIRECTIVES INFO. SYS., GEORGIA DIVISION OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN S ERVICES CHILD WELFARE
POLICY MANUAL § 14.26 (2021) (describing the duty of a child’s temporary caregiver to apply a “reasonable
and prudent parenting standard” while making decisions in the day-to-day care of the child or children placed
under their physical custody).
27 Smith v. Org. Foster Fams. for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844–47 (1977) (finding that, despite the
“deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care[,]” the foster
family “has its source in state law and contractual arrangements[,]” and thus the liberty interests of the foster
parent must be “substantially attenuated where the proposed removal from the foster family is to return the child
to his natural parents”).
28 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY & CHILD.’S BUREAU, DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 1, 2 (2020), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/best_interest.pdf (explaining the centrality of the
“best interests of the child” standard in judicial determinations affecting “placement and [child] custody
determinations, safety and permanency planning, and proceedings for termination of parental rights”). The “best
interests of the child” permeates many decisions surrounding the care and custody of children, and although it
denotes no set definition across jurisdictions, the standard generally allows courts to consider a number of factors
such as emotional ties between the child and their siblings or parents; the parents’ capacity to provide for the
child; the mental, physical, and emotional needs of the child; and various other factors that may come to bear on
the child’s situation in both positive and negative ways. Id.
29
See Linda L. Lane, The Parental Rights Movement, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 825, 837 (1988).
30 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); accord Susan E. Lawrence, Substantive Due Process and Parental Rights:
From Meyer v. Nebraska to Troxel v. Granville, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 71, 73 (2006). In 1920, Robert Meyer, a
teacher at a parochial school in Nebraska, was convicted of violating the Nebraska’s anti-foreign language law.
Lawrence, supra, at 71–74. After his conviction was upheld by the Nebraska Supreme Court, Meyer appealed
to the U.S. Supreme Court, where his conviction was overturned. Id.
31 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
32 Id. at 400–01 (“Evidently the legislature has attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modern
language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control
the education of their own.”).
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fundamental right of a parent to make key decisions in the upbringing of their
child.33
Two years after Meyer, the Court decided its second major parental rights
case, Pierce v. Society of Sisters.34 The Court in Pierce struck down an Oregon
compulsory education statute that required all children between ages of eight
and sixteen to attend public schools, holding the statute “unreasonably
interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control.”35 The Court reaffirmed its prior
recognition of parental rights, going on to proclaim, “[t]he child is not the mere
creature of the State,” but rather, the parents “have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”36 In framing
the child as such, the Court reinforced the idea of the family as a province carved
out from undue interference by the state, thus strengthening the jurisprudence
recognizing parental rights.37
Meyer and Pierce set the stage for subsequent cases upholding a parent’s
right to make key decisions for their child. The Court has upheld parental rights
in other contexts, such as an unwed father’s right to a hearing on parental fitness
prior to the removal of his children;38 an unwed father’s right to block the
adoption of his children where the father had been involved in the children’s
lives;39 and parents’ rights to govern the religious upbringing and education of
their children, even where it deviated from state education regulations. 40 In 1982,
the Court struck down a statute requiring only “fair preponderance of the
evidence” as the standard for termination of parental rights, mandating instead
that the state meet the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence given
the fundamental nature of parental rights.41 The Court even affirmed the right of
33 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207,
214, 222, 232 (1972); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 77 (2000).
34 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35.
35 Id. at 535.
36 Id.
37 Richard Seid, 75 Years After Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 78 U. DETROIT MERCY L. REV. 373, 374 (2001)
(“Furthermore, [Pierce], read for all it is worth, opens the door to a limitless and standardless development of
substantive due process.”).
38 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
39 Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 381–82 (1979).
40 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
41 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982). The Court in Santosky noted that, even when parents
fail to act as “model parents,” their fundamental liberty interest in the care and upbringing of their children “does
not evaporate.” Id. at 753. Moreover, in Reno v. Flores, the Court noted the best interests of the child may be
“subordinated to the interests of other children, or indeed even to the interests of the parents or guardians,”
suggesting the best interests of the child standard is not always the applicable litmus test to determine parental
fitness. 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993).
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parents to commit their child to a mental institution over the child’s own
objection, reasoning that the law presumes parents possess superior capacity for
judgment, rational decision-making, and “generally . . . act in the child’s best
interests.”42 In one of its more recent parental rights cases, the Court also
protected the parent’s right to govern decisions regarding child visitation absent
a finding of parental unfitness.43
Despite the Court’s consistent affirmation of parental rights, it has set limits
concerning who is entitled to the rights and responsibilities of a legal parent and
what those rights entail. For instance, the Court has rejected the rights of fathers
to establish paternity or legitimate their children absent some indicia of
relationship with the child,44 and, in some cases, has rejected such a right even
when such indicia of relationship did exist.45 In the realm of representation, the
Court has held indigent parents are not constitutionally entitled to an attorney in
child custody proceedings, despite the gravity of the interests at stake.46 Further,
as discussed in the following section, parental rights are subject to significant
limitations by the state when the child is endangered or is at risk of
endangerment.47
Thus, it is clear the Court grants significant, though not limitless, authority
to the legal parent to make decisions regarding the upbringing of their child. This
authority often wins out over other competing interests held by third parties or

42 Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602–03, 620–21 (1979). However, the Court in Parham conditioned their
holding on the reasoning that the state statute required third-party review before a child could be institutionalized.
Id. at 604, 606, 620–21.
43 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66–67 (2000).
44 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (disallowing a putative father from blocking or vacating
an adoption of his biological child where the father had not established a substantial relationship with the child,
noting “the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection”); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255–56 (1978) (holding a biological father was not allowed to bar his child’s adoption
where the biological father was never substantially involved in the child’s life and failed to petition for
legitimation until the child was eleven years old).
45 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128–29 (1989) (finding that a biological father, despite
having a relationship with his child, could not establish paternity where the child already had a presumptive
father under relevant state law).
46 Lassiter v. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 18, 33 (1981). But see Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the
Courts, and the Right to Free Counsel for Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services of Durham, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 635, 639 (2006) (noting that, despite the
Court’s holding in Lassiter, most states do provide counsel for indigent parents in proceedings terminating
parental rights).
47 See infra Section I.C.
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the state,48 but can be temporarily suspended—or even revoked—if such action
is demanded by the countervailing interests of child protection. 49
C. Parens Patriae: The Powers of the State
Parens patriae50 is a legal doctrine encompassing the state’s power to assume
care and protection of a child.51 When the state removes a child from their legal
parents due to a finding of actual or perceived abuse or neglect, the state is
exercising its parens patriae authority.52 Under this authority, the state
encroaches on the rights of the parent to protect the child’s best interests. 53 The
foster care system is one of the state’s mechanisms for exercising its parens
patriae authority when it determines a child is no longer safe at home.54
The Court explicitly addressed the state’s power to exercise its parens patriae
authority in Prince v. Massachusetts.55 In Prince, the Court considered whether
a child’s guardian,56 also a professing Jehovah’s Witness, 57 violated
Massachusetts’s child labor laws by furnishing her nine-year-old niece with
religious materials to distribute on the street.58 The guardian argued her actions
were protected by the First Amendment Free Exercise clause and the right to
parental authority recognized in Meyer.59 Though the Court acknowledged the
importance of the religious and parental rights at stake, the Court ultimately

48 Pierce v. Soc’y Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Santoksy v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982);
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304–05 (1993) (denying a facial challenge by a class of juvenile aliens to an
Immigration and Naturalization Service regulation that required juvenile aliens to be detained on suspicion of
being deported and to be released only to their parents or legal guardians absent especially compelling
circumstances).
49 See infra Section I.C.
50 The terminology of parens patriae was taken from chancery court, used to describe the state’s power to
take control of the property and person of the child when acting in loco parentis, or in the place of a parent.
Stacy Robinson, Comment, Remedying Our Foster Care System: Recognizing Children’s Voices, 27 FAM. L.Q.
395, 395 n.2 (1993).
51 Harper, supra note 24, at 802.
52 Carolyn Curtis, The Psychological Parent Doctrine in Custody Disputes Between Foster Parents and
Biological Parents, 16 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 149, 165–66 (1980).
53 Id. at 166.
54
Harper, supra note 24, at 802–03.
55 321 U.S. 158, 165–67 (1944).
56 The plaintiff in Prince was the aunt of the child in her care and had legal custody over the child, thus the
Court ascribed to her the same level of parental rights as it would a natural parent. Id. at 159, 161.
57 Jehovah’s Witnesses are members of a Christian religious group, known for their extreme devotion to
proselytism and idiosyncratic beliefs, including deep distrust of the government and other organized institutions.
Michael Lipka, A Closer Look at Jehovah’s Witnesses Living in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 26, 2016),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/26/a-closer-look-at-jehovahs-witnesses-living-in-the-u-s/.
58 Prince, 321 U.S. at 159–61.
59 Id. at 164.
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ruled against the guardian, finding the state could—as a valid exercise of its
parens patriae authority—restrict parental control by imposing limitations “to
guard the general interest in youth’s well-being.”60 The Court maintained that
“the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority
in things affecting the child’s welfare,”61 and that such authority may be
exercised to a greater degree over children than adults.62 Thus, the Court in
Prince set key limitations on parents’ rights to control the activities of their child
where the parents’ choices might put the child at risk of harm.63
D. The Rights of the Foster Parent
Once the state has exercised its authority to remove a child from their legal
parent or guardian, the child is sometimes placed into the physical custody of
the state, often in a foster home, to receive temporary care.64 One prevalent
criticism of the foster care system, however, is that a foster child’s status is
anything but temporary.65 The issue of “foster care drift”—when a child moves
from home to home and is trapped in the system for years on end—garnered
widespread attention in the 1970s.66 Despite growing concerns and increasing
federalization of foster care legislation,67 states differ significantly on what
rights and authority foster parents hold in relation to the children in their care. 68
60

Id. at 166.
Id. at 167.
62 Id. at 168.
63 Id. at 170 (“Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in
identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before [their children] have reached the age of full
and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.”). However, the Court has not imposed a
clear duty of care on the state for children in its custody. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993) (“Thus, childcare institutions operated by the State in the exercise of its parens patriae authority . . . are not constitutionally
required to be funded at such a level as to provide the best schooling or the best health care available; nor does
the Constitution require them to substitute, wherever possible, private nonadoptive custody for institutional
care.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Tanya M. Washington, Throwing Black Babies out with the
Bathwater: A Child-Centered Challenge to Same-Sex Adoption Bans, 6 HASTINGS R ACE & POVERTY L.J. 1, 13
(2008) (“The long-term social, educational, developmental and emotional costs to children raised in foster and
institutional care are well documented.”).
64 See Harper, supra note 24, at 802–03.
65
Curtis, supra note 52, at 150.
66 See id.; Asman, supra note 7, at 116.
67 See, e.g., Wald, supra note 12, at 10 fig. 1 (depicting a timeline of major federal legislation regulating
the foster care system and exhibiting twenty-nine separate pieces of legislation passed from 1974 to 2015).
68 See generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY & CHILD.’S BUREAU, BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR
PROSPECTIVE
FOSTER,
ADOPTIVE,
AND
KINSHIP
C AREGIVERS
(2018),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/background.pdf (describing over the course of ninety-four pages the
varying state approaches to background check requirements for prospective child caretakers); C HILD WELFARE
INFO. GATEWAY & CHILD.’S BUREAU, KINSHIP GUARDIANSHIP AS A PERMANENCY OPTION (2018),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/kinshipguardianship.pdf (outlining the differing approaches in all states
61
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In all states, foster parents have at least some authority to make decisions
concerning the day-to-day upbringing of foster children, such as clothing,69
meals, extracurricular activities,70 and daily needs.71 Foster parents also have the
right to assist with development of the child’s care plan in many states,72 and, in
a few states, foster parents even have the right to refuse placement or request
removal of a child from their foster home.73 Moreover, in Nevada, foster parents
can even limit a foster child’s exercise of the child’s own rights if the child
causes disruption in the foster home.74
However, no matter how close to parental rights they may seem, the statutory
rights granted to foster parents do not rise to the same level as those of a fit legal
parent.75 The actions of the foster parent are subject to oversight and approval
and U.S. territories to allowing kinship guardianship as opposed to traditional foster care placements and each
state’s varying grant of rights and duties to kinship guardians).
69 See, e.g., GA. DIV. FAM. & CHILD SERVS., FOSTER PARENT MANUAL 53 (2017),
https://fostergeorgia.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Georgia-Foster-Parent-Manual-September-2017.pdf
(establishing a foster child’s clothing as the purview of the foster parent and the caseworker) [hereinafter FOSTER
PARENT MANUAL].
70 See, e.g., id. at 22 (noting the responsibility of choosing a child’s extracurricular activities is held by the
foster parent).
71 MO. REV. STAT. § 210.566(1) (2020) (granting foster parents the right to “make decisions about the daily
living concerns of the child”); S.D. ADMIN. R. 67:42:05:13 (1) (2016) (“[A foster parent] shall provide daily
activities designed to promote physical, social, intellectual, and emotional development of the children in the
foster parent’s home in accordance with the reasonable and prudent parent standard.”); ILL. DEP’T OF CHILD. &
FAM. SERVS., FOSTER FAMILY HANDBOOK 13 (2014) (requiring that foster parents “have input into educational
planning” and “encourage children to participate in school-related and extracurricular activities”); TENN. DEP’T
OF CHILD.’S SERVS., FOSTER PARENT HANDBOOK : JOURNEY TO EXCELLENCE 19 (2022) (“On a daily basis, foster
parents . . . [p]rovide day to day care.”).
72 See, e.g., CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY & CHILD.’S BUREAU, CASE PLANNING FOR FAMILIES
INVOLVED
WITH
CHILD
WELFARE
AGENCIES
3
n.10
(2018),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/caseplanning.pdf (explaining that foster parents may participate in a
foster child’s case plan in eighteen states); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:286.13(6) (2007) (“Foster parents shall be
entitled to . . . [t]he right to actively participate in the development of the child’s case plan, educational plan,
and in other service planning decision-making processes.”). A case plan is a vital part of a foster child’s
experience in the child welfare system. The case plan, also known as a care plan, outlines aspects of the child’s
time in foster care, such as the circumstances causing the child’s placement in foster care, an assessment of the
child’s (and the child’s family’s) strengths and needs, specific goals for the child’s permanency, a timeline for
services, and a schedule of visits between the child and family members. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-201
(2020).
73 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-12A-1(11) (1975) (affirming the foster parent’s right to refuse placement of
a foster child within the parent’s home and to request the removal of a child from the parent’s home with no
adverse consequences).
74 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.545 (West 2013) (authorizing a foster parent to impose
“reasonable restrictions” on a child’s exercise of his or her rights to ensure “order, discipline or safety of the
foster home”).
75 Smith v. Org. Foster Fams. for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844–47 (1977) (finding that, despite the
“deeply loving interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care,” the foster family
“has its source in state law and contractual arrangements,” and thus the liberty interests of the foster parent “must
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by the foster care agency76 and, ultimately, the state.77 This system, punctured
by supervision from various parties, leaves foster parents with an incomplete set
of rights over the children in their care, producing difficulty for foster parents in
navigating the constant decisions attendant to everyday life. 78 For instance, the
consent of a minor’s legal parent or guardian is often required before the minor
can receive medical treatment, even in the face of a medical crisis. This
requirement is made significantly more difficult when the legal parent or
guardian is difficult or even impossible to access. 79 Thus, although physicians
may be able to provide care under an emergency exception, this quandary might
result in some delay of treatment and confusion because the proper consentholder is not the same party providing daily care to the child. 80
In addition to the everyday caretaking decisions largely governed by state
law, the Court also weighed in on the foster parents’ rights to a relationship with
the child in the 1977 case, Smith v. O.F.F.E.R.81 The plaintiffs in O.F.F.E.R.82
sought an injunction to a New York regulation allowing the state to remove
foster children from the foster parents’ home despite the foster parents’
objections.83 While the Court acknowledged that a close relationship may exist
be substantially attenuated where the proposed removal from the foster family is to return the child to his natural
parents”).
76 TERESA TOGUCHI SWARTZ, NEW APPROACHES IN SOCIOLOGY : STUDIES IN SOCIAL INEQUALITY, SOCIAL
CHANGE, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE in PARENTING FOR THE STATE: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF NON-PROFIT
FOSTER CARE 3 (Nancy A. Naples ed., 2013); see, e.g., FOSTER PARENT MANUAL, supra note 69, at 8.
77 TOGUCHI SWARTZ, supra note 76, at 3; see, e.g., GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 290-9-2-.06(10) (stating
behavior management of foster children by their foster parents must not include techniques such as corporal
punishment, seclusion, or deprivation of meals, hydration, or sleep).
78 Hannah Roman, Foster Parenting as Work, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 179, 181, 195, 200 (2016); see,
e.g., N.J. DEP’T CHILD. & FAMILIES, A GUIDE FOR PARENTS WHEN YOUR CHILD IS IN FOSTER CARE 17 (2014),
https://www.nj.gov/dcf/families/dcpp/ParentGuideFosterCare_English.pdf (stating that, among other rights, the
legal parent retains the right “to make important decisions regarding [the] child’s health and educational needs”
while their child is in foster care).
79 Strassburger, supra note 23, at 1124 (explaining that if a foster child needs a major medical procedure
and the legal parent cannot be reached, a welfare agency or a guardian ad litem must petition the judge for
permission to obtain the procedure, which can take considerable time).
80 See, e.g., Moira A. Szilagyi, David S. Rosen, David Rubin, Sarah Zlotnik, Council on Foster Care,
Adoption, & Kinship Care, Comm. on Adolescence & Council on Early Childhood, Health Care Issues for
Children and Adolescents in Foster Care and Kinship Care, 136 PEDIATRICS 1142, 1149 (2015) (noting that
“[i]n situations in which the birth parent/guardian is uncooperative or unable to provide consent,” the child
welfare director may be able to provide consent but only “after diligent effort has been made to engage the
parent/guardian” and sometimes only after the commissioner has petitioned the courts for consent).
81 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
82 The plaintiff class in O.F.F.E.R. included a number of individual foster parents and an organization
representing foster parents’ interests. Id. at 818 & n.1.
83 The relevant New York procedure required the state to provide the foster parents with ten days’ notice
before removal of the child could be effectuated and allowed the foster parents to object and plead their case in
a hearing prior to the removal. Id. at 820 n.3. The Court’s primary consideration in O.F.F.E.R. was whether this
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between foster parents and children in their care, it left open the question of what
constitutional liberty interests—if any—foster parents possess.84 The O.F.F.E.R.
majority hypothesized the existence of such a “liberty interest,” but decided the
case on narrower procedural grounds.85 However, some subsequent interpreters
of O.F.F.E.R. have surmised that the Court’s opinion points toward a lack of
such “liberty interest” for foster parents, especially when pitted against the
interest a child’s legal parent has in the care and custody of the child. 86
Ultimately, the Court determined that because foster parents did not have a
liberty interest in the care and custody of foster children coequal to that of legal
parents, New York’s removal procedure was constitutional.87

system provided adequate procedural protections to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 818–20; Steven W. Fitschen & Eric A. DeGroff, Is It Time for the Court to Accept the
O.F.F.E.R.: Applying Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform to Promote Clarity,
Consistency, and Federalism in the World of De Facto Parenthood, 24 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 419, 420–21
(2015).
84 Smith, 431 U.S. at 844–45, 847 (noting that, although the “appellees’ claim . . . raises complex and novel
questions,” the Court will decide the case on narrower grounds).
85 Id. at 847, 856 (“Since we hold that the procedures provided by New York State . . . are adequate to
protect whatever liberty interests appellees may have, the judgment of the District Court is reversed.” (emphasis
added)). In concurrence, Justice Stewart rejected the idea of a liberty interest for foster parents, arguing “the
relationship for which constitutional protection is asserted would not even exist” but for the state placing the
child with the foster parent. Id. at 856. (Stewart, J., concurring). As such, Justice Stewart felt states can choose
to dissolve the relationship without considering foster parents’ interests at all. Id. at 857–58, 863.
86 Curtis, supra note 52, at 170 (“[M]any commentators view [O.F.F.E.R.] as discouraging the notion that
the child’s interests may require an exception to the fit parent’s right to custody.”); Rodriguez v. McLoughlin,
214 F.3d 328, 341 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding foster parents did not have a liberty interest to the children in their
care); Kyees v. Cnty. Dep’t Publ. Welfare, 600 F.2d 693, 693, 699 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding foster parents and
foster children were not entitled to due process protections prior to removal); Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t
Fam. & Child.’s Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1207 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978) (finding the
foster family has never been given equivalent protections to the natural or adoptive family in the eyes of the
law). But see Mark Strasser, Deliberate Indifference, Professional Judgment, and the Constitution: On Liberty
Interests in the Child Placement Context, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 241 (2008) (“OFFER would
seem to support the notion that the interests of the foster family in remaining intact have constitutional weight.”);
In re Diana P., 424 A.2d 178, 179 (N.H. 1980) (upholding foster parents’ right to intervene in a hearing to
terminate parental rights).
87 Smith, 431 U.S. at 853, 855–56. The Court’s decision in O.F.F.E.R. also prompted numerous
conversations regarding psychological and de facto parenthood. In essence, psychological parenthood proposes
the true parent of the child, and the child’s rightful custodian, is the individual with whom the child has developed
the strongest emotional bond, regardless of the biological relationship between the child and that individual.
Dailey, supra note 18, at 2164. By contrast, de facto parenthood is a court-adjudicated status awarded to an
individual who meets certain criteria, often set forth by state statute. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §
1891(3) (2016). States have recognized these concepts to varying degrees in making permanency determinations
for foster children, with several states giving preference to a child’s former or current foster parents when
considering renewed placement of a child who has formerly been in foster care or adoption of a foster child
whose parents’ legal rights have been terminated. See, e.g., Fitschen & DeGroff, supra note 83, at 427–36
(discussing the spectrum that exists among states of whether to accept or reject the notion of de facto or
psychological parenthood); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.360(1)(o)–(p) (2022).
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E. The Rights Gap: The Struggle that Ensues Where No Party Has Complete
Legal Rights over the Child in Foster Care
The multiplicity of parties involved in the care and upbringing of the foster
child often yields confusion and, unfortunately, dysfunction.88 While the state is
the party that retains custody over a child in foster care,89 the state has not always
been an adequate caretaker of the child. The reality is that state bureaucrats are
unable to exercise the same individualized and adaptable authority that a natural
parent can over a child. The state is simply too slow, too large, and too distant
from a child’s daily life to have the empathy and understanding of a natural
parent, and, though the state may try to work in the “best interests of the child,”
its calculus is oftentimes rather cold and limited by the financial and logistical
restrictions attendant to operating such a large and complex system. 90
In the absence of natural parents, the state attempts to overcome these
problems through use of foster agencies and, ultimately, foster families or
institutional caretakers.91 But these caretaking parties do not have the rights to
exercise the same level of authority over the children in their care as a natural
legal parent has.92 Furthermore, by design, these parties are intended to be
temporary custodians of the foster child, thus limiting their ability to create the
kind of stable and lasting relationships that better serve the child’s emotional
and psychological needs.93 The real loser in all this is the child.94 Thus, when
the conflicting and incomplete rights of the legal parent, the state, and the foster
parent do not provide adequate protection of the rights of the foster child,
additional procedural safeguards must exist to ensure the child’s interests are
properly represented.

88 Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State’s Role in Child Neglect
and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 893–94 (1975) (explaining the conflicting interests between the state, the
parents, and the child).
89 Curtis, supra note 52, at 166.
90 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (discussing the child-rearing process and asserting “this
process, in large part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions”); see also Harper, supra
note 24, at 794–95 (“In a system riddled with institutional and professional abuses in which thousands of children
suffer from physical abuse and neglect, courts must work to find a suitable standard with which to judge the
performance of the child welfare system . . . .”); supra Section I.A.
91 Smith, 431 U.S. at 823.
92 Id. at 844–47.
93 Curtis, supra note 52, at 150.
94 See, e.g., Patricia Whitten, Comment, The Rights of Foster Parents to the Children in Their Care, 50
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 86, 92 (1973) (“Because of the weakness of the law in this area, the children are the losers
in such custody disputes.”).
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II. WHAT THE SUPREME COURT SAYS (AND DOES NOT SAY) ABOUT
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
This Part first discusses the rights of children as they have been recognized
and limited by the Supreme Court. It then focuses particularly on the mature
minor doctrine and judicial bypass procedure and the treatment of these concepts
by both the Supreme Court and state courts, suggesting these could be
implemented as a viable means of expanding foster children’s procedural
protections. Finally, this Part looks to the sparse line of Supreme Court precedent
addressing the rights of children in state care and custody, arguing this dearth of
recognition contributes to the “rights gap”95 in the lives of foster children.
A. The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Rights of Children
At base, children have constitutional rights.96 As early as 1932, the Supreme
Court in Powell v. Alabama recognized constitutional protections afforded to
children, but failed to define the scope of these rights.97 The Court has since
expanded its recognition of children’s rights in limited areas; however, it has not
always allowed the child’s interests to prevail against countervailing interests of
the state, the child’s parents, or other authorities.98 For instance, the Court has
recognized some substantive due process rights for children in juvenile
delinquency99 and free expression contexts.100 However, when measured against
the full scheme of constitutional rights guaranteed to their adult counterparts, the
ensemble of rights the Court attributes to children proves relatively slim.101
The Court’s hesitancy to more broadly recognize the rights of children makes
sense in light of the high valuation of parental rights discussed in Part I. 102 The
95

See supra Section I.E.
Dailey, supra note 18, at 2099–100 (explaining that, although children “were largely absent from the
class of constitutional rights-holders” for the past two centuries, the Supreme Court first explicitly recognized
children as constitutional rights-holders in 1932 in Powell v. Alabama).
97 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding that, despite their youth, defendants were still
entitled to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment).
98 See generally Susan Gluck Mezey, Constitutional Adjudication of Children’s Rights Claims in the
United States Supreme Court, 1953–92, 27 FAM. L.Q. 307, 308–10 (1993) (tracing the Supreme Court’s
treatment of children’s rights through the latter half of the twentieth century).
99 See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30–59 (1967) (recognizing a minor’s right to a selective number,
but not the entirety, of Sixth Amendment rights).
100 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (finding that students have First
Amendment rights which they are hardly expected to “shed . . . at the schoolhouse gate”).
101 See Dailey, supra note 18, at 2100–01 (partially attributing the “long history of denying children the full
range of constitutional rights” to “choice theory,” which purports that children lack the requisite mindset to be
fully rational actors, and thus are not entitled to the full spectrum of constitutional rights until they come of age).
102 See supra Section I.B.
96
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prevailing fear remains that if the Court granted children too many individual,
fundamental rights, children’s rights would come into frequent conflict with
parental rights,103 undermining the integrity of the family structure so adamantly
protected by the Court.104 However, this framework incorrectly assumes each
child has a fit, rational parent acting in the child’s best interests. 105 It also
assumes that when the child comes to the age of majority, the child will
automatically be equipped to make their own rational, mature decisions after
receiving the kind of morally and socially formative care a fit parent ought to
provide.106 While this framework may be ideal, it is far from realistic,
particularly in the case of the foster child.107 Research reveals foster children
consistently struggle to make the transition from the child welfare system to the
freedoms of adulthood, and are often subject to higher rates of substance abuse,
homelessness, and incarceration than their peers.108 These struggles, in part, can
be attributed to the child’s lack of autonomy while within the system109 paired
with their reaction to the unpredictable changes of life in foster care.110
103 Dailey, supra note 18, at 2100–01 (describing how the Court’s “enthusiastic recognition of parental
rights” suggests a view that children lack the mature state of mind to exercise their own constitutional rights,
thus falling under the umbrella of their parents’ status as “constitutional rights-holders”).
104 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925);
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
105 Dailey, supra note 18, at 2114 (“The constitutional doctrine of parental rights reflects in part the view
that an upbringing for autonomous choice requires, in the first instance, a loving home in which parents have
the authority and duty to foster values in their children.”).
106 Joseph S. Jackson & Lauren G. Fasig, The Parentless Child’s Right to a Permanent Family, 46 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1, 29–30 (2011) (discussing the “importance of a secure and stable family relationship to a
child’s healthy development,” including the child’s ability to self-regulate and gain social competence and “form
a sense of his own identity”).
107 See, e.g., Dailey, supra note 18, at 2166 (noting the interests of the legal parent and the child are “no
longer aligned” where the parent is not the child’s primary caregiver); Nora E. Sydow & Victor E. Flango,
Physical and Emotional Well-Being: Court Performance Measures for Children and Youth in Foster Care, JUV.
& FAM. CT. J. 1, 10 (2012) (“[Foster youth] are often exposed to family violence, parental substance abuse and
mental illness, homelessness, or chronic poverty.”).
108 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY & CHILD.’S B UREAU, PREVENTING, IDENTIFYING, AND TREATING
SUBSTANCE
USE
AMONG
YOUTH
IN
FOSTER
CARE
2
(2020),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/bulletins_youthsud.pdf (citation omitted) (“According to data from the
National Youth in Transition Database, 27 percent of 17-year-olds in foster care had been referred for substance
use treatment . . . .”); Shannon Barnett, Foster Care Youth and the Development of Autonomy, 32 INT’L REV.
PSYCHIATRY 265, 265 (2020) (“[Y]outh who age out of foster care . . . experience rates of homelessness
estimated between 20–50% and experience unemployment rates of 20% . . . .”).
109 Barnett, supra note 108, at 265 (“[P]oor functional outcomes for many youth involved in foster care
suggest that many of these youth may not have adequately developed autonomy.”)
110 For instance, one study showed as many as 27% of children who left foster care for reunification with
their legal parents or placement with guardians reentered the foster care system, leading to uncertainty for the
child regarding the status of his or her permanent caretaker and skepticism about the likelihood of successful
reunification. Fred Wulczyn, FLORIE SCHMITS & SCOTT HUHR, CTR. FOR STATE CHILD WELFARE DATA,
REENTRY TO FOSTER CARE: IDENTIFYING CANDIDATES UNDER THE FAMILY FIRST ACT 22 (2019),
https://assets.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/chapinhall-reentrytofostercare-2020.pdf.
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Turning again to examine the lean body of case law delineating children’s
rights more broadly, one of the earliest areas where the Court recognized
children’s rights was in the realm of juvenile delinquency. In the 1967 case In
re Gault, the Court held for the first time that children possess a limited number
of procedural due process rights in some juvenile proceedings. 111 The Court in
Gault noted the possible dangers of the broad judicial discretion present in
juvenile proceedings, finding children should not lack several of the procedural
protections awarded to adults in criminal proceedings.112 Since Gault, the Court
has gone even further to recognize certain areas of exceptionalism in the juvenile
delinquency context, giving way to additional protections for minors not
provided to adult defendants.113 For instance, the Court has designated the death
penalty as applied to minors as a violation of the Eighth Amendment,114 and held
courts should consider age as a factor when evaluating the voluntariness of a
confession.115
Apart from the juvenile delinquency context, children’s rights have also
developed in the area of First Amendment free expression and free exercise. As
early as 1943, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court
held that schools cannot compel children to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, 116
painting children’s rights to free expression in broad strokes that it would temper
in later opinions.117 In a similar vein, the Court held in the 1969 case, Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District, that children have First

111

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (“The Latin phrase [parens patriae] proved to be a great help to those
who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky
and its historical credentials are of dubious relevance.”).
112 Id. at 18–19 (1967) (holding that juveniles have a right to notice of charges against them, appointment
of counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and the right against self-incrimination in proceedings where
deprivation of their physical liberty is at stake).
113 The expansion of children’s rights in the juvenile justice system are intertwined with the rights of foster
care children, given the high rates of “cross-over” between the foster care and juvenile justice systems. Wald,
supra note 12, at 27.
114 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573–74, 578–79 (2005).
115 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 264, 272 (2011) (basing their conclusion, in part, on the wellestablished precedent that children are “generally . . . less mature and responsible than adults,” and are “more
vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pressures” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599–601 (1948) (holding a child’s confession taken during an interrogation where
the child was without representation or his parents was coerced in violation of the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54–55 (1962) (finding a child should not be viewed
to possess the same maturity as an adult when determining whether a child’s confession was coerced).
116 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (affirming children’s rights to abstain from saying the Pledge of Allegiance in
schools based on ideological or religious objections).
117 Dailey, supra note 18, at 2124 (“The Court did not indicate that it was interpreting the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause in any way differently than it would have had the school children been
adults.”).
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Amendment rights to free speech and expression, which they are not forced to
“shed . . . at the schoolhouse gate.”118
1. The Abortion Cases: The Mature Minor Doctrine and Judicial Bypass
Procedure
Another area where the Court has more readily recognized the rights of
children is in the context of medical decision-making and, specifically, a minor’s
right to an abortion. This body of law illustrates judicial incorporation of the
mature minor doctrine, a mechanism for considering a minor’s capability of
making key decisions. This Comment’s proposed solution will draw upon the
mature minor doctrine in Part IV.
Only three years after the Court upheld a woman’s right to abortion in the
1973 case Roe v. Wade,119 the Court addressed the same question as applied to
minors in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth.120 In Danforth,
the Court struck down a state statute requiring parental consent before a minor
could obtain an abortion.121 In justifying its decision, the Court reasoned that
“[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when
one attains the state-defined age of majority,” affirming that “[m]inors, as well
as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”122
However, the Court’s subsequent treatment of minors’ access to abortion
after Danforth expressed a more reserved approach.123 For instance, six years
after Danforth, in Bellotti v. Baird, a case also concerning a parental notification
statute, the Court explicitly listed three reasons for why the constitutional rights
of children cannot be coequal to those of adults: (1) children’s “peculiar
vulnerability;” (2) “their inability to make critical decisions in an informed,

118 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640, 643 (1968) (upholding a
New York statute designating certain material “obscene” for minors but not adults by appealing to parental
interests in the upbringing of their children and the parens patriae powers of the state to “protect the welfare of
children” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682, 685 (1986)
(“[T]he constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of
adults in other settings.”).
119 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973), overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228
(2022).
120 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
121 Id. at 75.
122 Id. at 74.
123 Compare id. (“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains
the state-defined age of majority.”), with Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638–39 (1979) (“Legal restrictions on
minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child’s chances for the full
growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.”).

2022]

DID ANYONE ASK THE CHILD?

405

mature manner;” and (3) “the importance of the parental role in child rearing.”124
However, despite the Court’s clear outline of the differences between adults and
minors, it still struck down the parental consent requirement with a judicial
exception for “good cause shown,” finding that the good cause standard was still
too discretionary to afford mature minors an adequate opportunity to prove their
competence to consent to an abortion.125 Going forward, the Court consistently
upheld state statutory schemes with one-parent notification and consent
requirements, provided that such statutes allowed for a judicial bypass option,
thus preserving the applicability of the mature minor doctrine to this area of
law.126
Danforth and Bellotti demonstrate the Court’s adoption of the mature minor
doctrine in the abortion context. In these cases, the Court required states to
include in their minor abortion statutes a unique procedural protection known as
a judicial bypass—a legal mechanism that allows a minor to obtain permission
from a judge that overrides a requirement for parental consent or notification
prior to obtaining an abortion.127 However, procuring a judicial bypass is not
always easy. For instance, in Georgia, a minor must first file a petition with the
clerk’s office of any juvenile court in the state.128 After the minor files their
petition with the juvenile court, a judge will schedule a hearing to take place
three days after filing where the judge will ask questions to determine whether
the minor is mature enough to be granted a judicial bypass, or whether a judicial
bypass is in the minor’s best interests.129
The judicial bypass framework, unique to the context of minors requesting
abortions, demonstrates the Court’s utilization of an additional procedural
protection to allow minors to make autonomous decisions outside the authority

124

Id. at 634.
Id. at 644, 650 (noting the “unique character” of the right to an abortion as one justification for the
Court’s decision to overturn the statutory scheme in question).
126 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (upholding a one-parent consent
requirement for a minor to obtain an abortion with a judicial bypass option); Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S.
292, 298–99 (1997) (same). But see Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 457–58 (1990) (striking down a state
statute requiring two-parent notification on the grounds that it unjustifiably interfered with the privacy of the
family).
127 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74–75 (1976); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647–48;
Judicial Bypass, PLANNED PARENTHOOD LEAGUE OF MASS., https://www.plannedparenthood.org/plannedparenthood-massachusetts/online-health-center/judicial-bypass (last visited Aug. 17, 2022).
128 Judicial Bypass Wiki: Georgia, IF, WHEN, HOW: LAWYERING FOR REPROD. JUST., (Aug. 16, 2022, 3:50
PM)
https://judicialbypasswiki.ifwhenhow.org/wiki/georgia/#:~:text=What%20is%20a%20judicial%20bypass,free
%20if%20you%20want%20one.
129 Id.
125
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of their parents.130 While the Court was not clear on which constitutional right
mandates this additional protection,131 this procedure holds promising potential
for expansion into other decisions a mature minor may be well-poised to make,
and, as suggested by this Comment, offers an opportunity to expand the active
rights of children in foster care.132
Although Bellotti did not introduce the mature minor doctrine to the Court
until 1972, the doctrine has long been germinating in lower courts and
legislatures in contexts beyond abortion. The mature minor doctrine originated
in the common law but has been codified by several states.133 The doctrine
allows minors who have shown themselves to be adequately informed, rational
decision-makers to supply or withhold consent for medical treatment over the
objection of other interested parties, such as the minor’s parents, doctors, and
the state.134 The requisite criteria for maturity is set by the jurisdiction in which
the minor appeals to the court, but most jurisdictions focus on factors such as
“age, ability, experience, education, training, and degree of maturity or judgment

130

Id.
See Martin Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 589, 639
(2002) (arguing Bellotti did not recognize an expansion of constitutional rights for minors, but merely shifted
the adult oversight of the minor’s abortion decision from the parent to the judge).
132 See infra Section IV.A. Further, according to a report compiled by the Children’s Bureau, as of
September 30, 2020, 47% of children in foster care were age eight or older, while 22% of foster children were
age fourteen or older. ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES: CHILD.’S BUREAU, THE AFCARS REPORT, supra note 6.
Though age is not determinative in the mature minor evaluation, this suggests a significant number of foster
children may be well-poised to prove themselves of sufficient maturity to take on greater responsibility in their
own decision-making.
133 Emily Ikuta, Overcoming the Parental Veto: How Transgender Adolescents Can Access PubertySuppressing Hormone Treatment in the Absence of Parental Consent under the Mature Minor Doctrine, 25 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 179, 199 (2016) (“The mature minor exception to the parental consent requirement first
developed through common law in the 1800s.”). The mature minor doctrine has since been codified in some
jurisdictions. E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-30-3(o) (West 2022) (“‘Mature minor’ means a person, less than 18
years of age, who has been determined by a qualified physician, a qualified psychologist, or an advanced nurse
practitioner to have the capacity to make health care decisions.”); ARK CODE ANN. § 20-9-602(7) (2019)
(allowing “[a]ny unemancipated minor of sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate the consequences
of the proposed surgical or medical treatment or procedures” to consent for themselves). Other jurisdictions have
established the doctrine by judicial decision. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 755 (Tenn. 1987)
(establishing the mature minor doctrine in Tennessee); In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 326 (Ill. 1989) (establishing
the mature minor doctrine in Illinois, though weighed against the wishes of the third parties such as the minor’s
parents).
134 Cara D. Watts, Asking Adolescents: Does a Mature Minor Have a Right to Participate in Health Care
Decisions?, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 221, 238 (2005); see also Melinda T. Derish & Kathleen Vanden
Heuvel, Mature Minors Should Have the Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 28 J.L., MED. &
ETHICS 109, 110 (2000) (arguing chronically ill mature minors should have the right to withhold consent for
life-sustaining medical treatment).
131
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obtained by the child, . . . [and] whether the minor has the capacity to appreciate
the nature, risks, and consequences”135 of the matter at hand.
Presently, at least six states have indicated acceptance of the mature minor
doctrine, while most others have remained silent on the issue.136 Though the
Court has not discussed the mature minor doctrine outside the abortion context,
several state supreme courts have upheld the doctrine as applied to other types
of medical consent provided by minors.137 Use of the doctrine in several
jurisdictions suggests that when it is paired with the procedural protection of the
judicial bypass proceeding, it has potential to be expanded beyond the medical
context to provide greater recognition for foster children’s decision-making
abilities in appropriate situations.138 As discussed in Part IV, this Comment
asserts that such potential must become a reality.
B. Constitutional Rights for Foster Children? A Blank Slate
Turning from the state of children’s rights broadly to the foster child’s rights
specifically, Court precedent contouring foster children’s rights proves scant.
The right to receive food, water, and adequate medical treatment for individuals
subject to state care and custody is well-established.139 Moreover, the Court has
upheld the child’s affirmative right to education, regardless of citizenship or
familial status.140 However, beyond these most basic rights, the Court has
135

Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 838 (W. Va. 1992).
Shawna Benston, Not of Minor Consequence?: Medical Decision-Making Autonomy and the Mature
Minor Doctrine, 13 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 10 & n.29 (2016) (noting Illinois, Maine, Tennessee, West Virginia,
Michigan, and Massachusetts have all “held or suggested that mature minors, like other competent people, have
the right to consent to or forego medical treatment” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
137 See In re E.G., 549 N.E. at 328; Cardwell, 724 S.W. at 748–49; Belcher, 422 S.E. 2d at 838; Baird v.
Att’y Gen., 360 N.E.2d 288, 296 (Mass. 1977).
138 See infra Section IV.A.
139 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires the
state to provide individuals involuntary committed in mental institutions with services necessary to ensure
“reasonable safety” for themselves and others); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
199–200 (1989) (noting when the state restrains an individual’s freedom through “incarceration,
institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty,” the state owes a duty of “food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, and reasonable safety”); Strasser, supra note 86, at 223 (“Courts in many of the circuits have
recognized that foster children have limited rights against the state with respect to the care that they receive.”);
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 807 (3d Cir. 2000) (“After DeShaney, many of our sister courts of appeals held
that foster children have a substantive due process right to be free from harm at the hands of state-regulated
foster parents.”); Kara B. v. Dane County, 555 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Wis. 1996) (“We hold that those entrusted
with the task of ensuring that children are placed in a safe and secure foster home owe a constitutional duty that
is determined by a professional judgment standard.”); Andrea L. ex rel. Judith B. v. Child. & Youth Servs.
Lawrence Cnty., 987 F. Supp. 418, 423 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (noting the “well accepted” right of foster children to
be free from extreme psychological harm).
140 Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
136
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hesitated to expand the state’s duty of care to encompass fewer tangible rights,
such as moral or psychological formation.141
Some scholars argue foster children possess a right to permanency142 and
more robust kinds of care that will form their social and emotional well-being.143
This argument is partially rooted in the reasoning that such permanency and
emotional stability are fundamental in forming children into productive
members of society144 and addressing the high crossover rates between the foster
care system and the juvenile justice system.145 However, the movement to
promote permanency for foster children—sometimes achieved through
adoption—is not without its critics. Some writers condemn the elevation of
adoption in American child welfare law, arguing against a one-size-fits-all
solution.146 Other critics point out the disproportionate demands of adoption on
children of color and children from poor families, arguing adoption calls upon
these children to surrender their past lives and start anew in the name of
“rebirth,” despite the fact such a solution may not actually be in the best interests
of the child.147 Furthermore, the option of an adoption can serve to exacerbate
the already traumatic experience of family separation for some children who—
despite what may be a manifest showing of parental unfitness—still desire a
relationship with their natural parents.148

141 Dailey, supra note 18, at 2116 (“Parental rights operate as an important limitation on the state’s power
to mold children through the indoctrination of morals.”).
142 See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Waiting for Loving: The Child’s Fundamental Right to Adoption,
34 CAP. U. L. REV. 297, 316 (2005) (arguing adoption, like marriage, “is the statutory recognition of a
fundamental family relationship”); Jackson & Fasig, supra note 106, at 2–3 (arguing the parentless child has a
fundamental right to a permanent family relationship stemming from the state’s duty to provide the nurturing
necessary to develop the child into an “autonomous human being”).
143 See Jackson & Fasig, supra note 106, at 3 (noting the importance of “enduring attachment
relationship[s]” in forming the child’s self-regulation skills and sense of autonomy and promoting “healthy
psychological adjustment”).
144 Dailey, supra note 18, at 2155–56; Jackson & Fasig, supra note 106, at 20, 28 (discussing how
“attachment relationship[s]” early on in an infant’s life are key to forming necessary social behaviors).
145 See Wald, supra note 12, at 27 (“A large percentage of [foster care] youth ‘cross-over’ to the juvenile
justice system.”).
146 Sacha Coupet, Swimming Upstream Against the Great Adoption Tide: Making the Case for
“Impermanence”, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 405, 410 (2005) (critiquing adoption as a “downstream” solution to issues
of child welfare, which directs attention and resources from the “upstream,” root causes of child displacement
into the foster care system).
147 Marsha Garrison, Parents’ Rights vs. Children’s Interests: The Case of the Foster Child, 22 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 371, 387 (1996) (comparing the “legal[] reincarnat[ion]” associated with adoption with the
“family failure” and socioeconomic disadvantage associated with foster care).
148 Wald, supra note 12, at 8 (noting “removal can be traumatic for many children,” especially where
subsequent placements fail to provide children with adequate care).
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Another common solution to the issue of permanency in foster care is kinship
placement, where a child is removed from the home and placed with a relative
who agrees to care for the child in the legal parent’s stead. 149 While some
scholars praise kinship placements as less traumatic for the child,150 others
criticize the lack of regulation and oversight attendant to these placements,
pointing out that it too is an imperfect solution.151 In addition to the argument
for rights concerning permanency, other suggested rights for foster children
include a right to: visitation and placement with siblings;152 an environment
conducive to nurturing and moral formation;153 and a safe environment free from
egregious harm.154 While some of these rights are encouraged by the federal
statutes discussed in the following section,155 the Court has never recognized a
constitutional basis for such rights.156
In sum, although the Court has defined a limited number of constitutional
rights for children, there is little Supreme Court precedent governing what, if
any, unique constitutional rights are afforded to children in foster care. The
Court is consistently hesitant to overstep in the realm of children’s rights, lest
they tread on the long-established ground of parental rights and authority.157
However, as the children’s rights movement has gained popularity,

149 Child Welfare Info. Gateway, Kinship Care, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD.
& FAMILIES, CHILD.’S BUREAU, https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/outofhome/kinship/ (defining kinship care
as the placement of children in the homes of relatives or close family friends).
150 Wald, supra note 12, at 21 (acknowledging some evidence supports the conclusion children do better
when placed with relatives as opposed to traditional foster care placements with strangers).
151 Josh Gupta-Kagan, America’s Hidden Foster Care System, 72 STAN. L. REV. 841, 844 (2020)
(describing how kinship placements are “hidden from the public, the federal government, and policymakers”
due to the lack of reporting requirements in federal legislation for kinship placements).
152 Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1009–10 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding the plaintiffs, children in
state custody, stated a valid substantive due process claim where the plaintiffs alleged officers of the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services were deliberately indifferent in pursuing policies that impaired the
plaintiffs’ sibling relationships); Sydow & Flango, supra note 107, at 12.
153 Jackson & Fasig, supra note 106, at 28.
154 Id. at 5 (“[W]hen the government takes an individual into custody, the Constitution requires that at least
minimally adequate provision be made to protect the individual’s safety and welfare.”).
155 See infra Section III.A.
156
See Dailey, supra note 18, at 2169 (noting the Court has recognized a limited number of affirmative
constitutional rights for children, mostly in the area of procedure).
157 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989) (noting that,
although the state was criticized for failing to remove a child from a home where abuse was suspected, had the
state moved too quickly in removing the child, it would have been criticized for “improperly intruding into the
parent-child relationship”); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (“[C]onstitutional interpretation
has consistently recognized that the parents’ claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of
their children is basic in the structure of our society.”); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 75 (1976) (noting a minor’s privacy interest in obtaining an abortion must be weighed against, if anything,
a parent’s interest in the termination of the daughter’s pregnancy).
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commentators have increasingly pushed the Court to attribute more
constitutional rights to children, particularly those in state custody and care. 158
These sentiments have largely fallen on deaf ears thus far, since the Court has
yet to afford any significant expansion to children’s rights.159 However, as the
push for children’s rights gains momentum, such aims are increasingly reflected
in legislation at the federal and state levels, suggesting openness on the part of
legislatures to address the pressing issues in the nation’s foster care system. 160
III. BEYOND THE COURTROOM: FEDERAL AND STATE FOSTER CARE
LEGISLATION
The previous two Parts focused on an overview of the foster care system, the
rights of legal parents and foster parents, and Court precedent recognizing some
constitutional rights for children. This Part examines a sample of federal and
state legislation regulating the foster care system. It concludes that these
statutory enactments are ultimately inadequate to properly fill in the rights gap
that exists for the child in foster care and urges that greater procedural
protections are required to fully safeguard the active rights of the foster child.
A. Federal Legislation and Foster Care Reform
This section examines recent federal statutes imposing increased regulation
on state-run foster care systems. It also details the impact of these federal statutes
on the issues discussed previously, such as the foster child’s rights to decisionmaking authority, familial and psychological connections, medical decisions,
and other daily choices. It then discusses the pitfalls of the federal legislation. 161

158 Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1009–10 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Sydow & Flango, supra note 107,
at 12; Dailey, supra note 18, at 2131; supra notes 144, 154 and accompanying text.
159 See, e.g., Michael J. Dale, The Supreme Court and the Minimization of Children’s Constitutional Rights:
Implications for the Juvenile Justice System, 13 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 199, 222 (1992) (noting the Court
has minimized constitutional rights for children, creating significant issues in the juvenile justice sphere
particularly); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 244–45 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (urging the
Court to consider the constitutional rights of Amish children, and not simply those of their parents, in striking
down a Wisconsin compulsory education statute).
160 See, e.g., Wald, supra note 12, at 10 fig. 1.
161 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Furthermore, since authority over child welfare is not a federal power enumerated in
the Constitution, this authority has historically fallen to the states. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY &
CHILD.’S
B UREAU,
HOW
THE
CHILD
WELFARE
SYSTEM
WORKS
1
(2020),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/cpswork.pdf. Therefore, the federal government has limited ability to
legislate in this area of law apart from tying legislation to spending initiatives. Id. at 1–2. However, if the federal
legislation does not protect a constitutional right and the ultimate authority is left to the states, each state may
choose whether to abide by the federal law and receive the corresponding federal funds or disregard federal law
and forego such funding. See id. This system weakens the effectiveness of federal foster care legislation.
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In doing so, it argues that current federal legislation does not provide an
adequate, workable solution to these problems, yielding the need for additional
safeguards to protect the rights of youth in foster care.
The federal government first provided grants to states for preventative and
protective child welfare services in 1912 with the creation of the Children’s
Bureau,162 and later formed the Child Welfare Services Program as part of the
Social Security Act in 1935.163 Though child welfare law is still largely within
the purview of the states,164 the federal government has regulated the foster care
system with various pieces of legislation throughout the years. 165
The first major federal law addressing the foster care system was the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 (“CAPTA”).166 CAPTA focuses
largely on encouraging states to gather data and set standards for reporting
mechanisms to keep track of and respond to instances of child abuse and
neglect.167 Moreover, CAPTA requires states, Indian tribes, and both private and
public organizations to develop informed response protocols and reporting
mechanisms for instances of substance abuse that result in child removal. 168
CAPTA urges states to provide children with either a guardian ad litem
(“GAL”)169 or a court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”)170 in some
proceedings.171 This right is limited: it applies only to abuse or neglect

162 STAFF OF H. WAYS & MEANS COMM., 112TH CONG., REP. ON CHILD WELFARE LEGIS. HIST. (Comm.
Print 2011), https://greenbook-waysandmeans.house.gov/book/export/html/303 [hereinafter STAFF OF H. WAYS
& MEANS COMM.].
163 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY & C HILD.’S BUREAU, MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION CONCERNED
WITH
CHILD
PROTECTION,
CHILD
WELFARE,
AND
ADOPTION
1
n.1
(2019),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/majorfedlegis.pdf.
164 See id. at 1.
165 See STAFF OF H. WAYS & MEANS COMM., supra note 162 (describing how a number of federal laws
regulate the foster care system by incentivizing states to comply with federal requirements in exchange for
funding).
166 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5119c.
167 See, e.g., id. § 5102(f)(3) (describing one of the duties of the advisory board on child abuse and neglect
as recommending “modifications needed to facilitate coordinated national data collection with respect to child
protection and child welfare”).
168
Id. § 5106(a).
169 A GAL is an individual who represents a child at all judicial proceedings related to an adjudication of
abuse or neglect. The GAL system functions differently in each state, with differing requirements surrounding
whether the GAL is a licensed attorney, has training in child welfare law and best practices, and how the GAL
advocates for the child. See CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY & CHILD.’S BUREAU, REPRESENTATION
OF
CHILDREN
IN
C HILD
ABUSE
AND
NEGLECT
PROCEEDINGS
1–2
(2021),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/represent.pdf.
170 A CASA is a lay volunteer who is appointed by a judge to advocate for a child’s best interests throughout
abuse and neglect proceedings. Robinson, supra note 50, at 402–03.
171 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii).
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proceedings before a judge, it does not require the child to have a licensed
attorney per se, and it only requires the child’s GAL or CASA to advocate for
the best interests of the child, without requiring deference to the child’s
wishes.172 Furthermore, like the vast majority of federal legislation in this area,
CAPTA only imposes these requirements on states in exchange for additional
funding, an offer states may choose to refuse.173
Subsequent federal legislation increased the focus on child permanency. In
1980, Congress passed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
(“AACWA”),174 which required that first and foremost, “reasonable efforts”
were taken to prevent removal of the child from their home. AACWA
accomplishes these objectives by increasing funding for family-centered
programs that address issues of abuse and neglect prior to removal of the
child.175 In the event removal is required, AACWA also mandates that states
make reasonable efforts to return the child to the home when it is safe and
possible to do so.176 Moreover, in the Fostering Connections to Success Act,
Congress requires states to make reasonable efforts to place siblings together
and locate extended family members for the possibility of pursuing a kinship
placement,177 reinforcing some of the relational rights contemplated in the
previous section.178 Congress addressed racial and ethnic inequities in the foster
care system by enacting the Multiethnic Placement Act (“MEPA”) in 1994,
which was revised in 1996 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of a child’s,
or the child’s potential foster or adoptive parents’, race, color, or national
origin.179 It also allows individuals to sue for enforcement of MEPA under Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act.180
Facing concerns about hasty reunification and the harms of placing children
back with their legal parents despite continued risk to the child, Congress
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Id. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii)(II).
Id. § 5116d (“A grant may not be made to a State under this subchapter unless an application therefor is
submitted by the State to the Secretary and such application contains the types of information specified by the
Secretary as essential . . . .”).
174
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 502 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S. § 671).
175 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B).
176 Id.
177 Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-351, 122 Stat.
3949, § 103.
178 See supra note 152 and accompanying text; Sydow & Flango, supra note 107, at 12.
179 Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 4056
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5115a); STAFF OF H. WAYS & MEANS COMM., supra note 162.
180 STAFF OF H. WAYS & MEANS C OMM., supra note 162.
173
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enacted the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (“ASFA”). 181 ASFA
stresses the importance of the child’s safety and welfare as “paramount” in any
reunification efforts and increases emphasis on adoption. 182 It establishes
exceptions to the “reasonable efforts” standard set forth by AACWA and enacts
measures to ensure the safety of children in temporary and long-term
placements, such as requiring background checks for prospective foster or
adoptive parents.183 ASFA also shortens the timeline for “permanency” hearings
to twelve months, and encourages permanency through both “time-limited
family reunification” and “adoption promotion and support services.” 184
Significantly, ASFA also requires states to initiate or join proceedings to
terminate parental rights on behalf of children who have been in the foster care
system for fifteen of the past twenty-two months (absent an exception).185
Following ASFA, subsequent federal legislation sought to increase caseworker
visits for children in foster care,186 ensure continuity of education and medical
care,187 provide extended services for youth aging out of foster care,188 and

181 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, § 305(c)(1) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 670).
182 STAFF OF H. WAYS & MEANS COMM., supra note 162; Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L.
No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, § 305(c)(1)(C) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 670).
183 STAFF OF H. WAYS & MEANS COMM., supra note 162 (describing the requirement for case plans to
address the child’s placement, services to the child, child’s parents, and child’s foster parents with the goal of
reunification or a new home for the child, and mandating reviews of the case plan every six months).
184 Id.; Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, § 103(c)(2)(B)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 670).
185 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, § 103(a)(3) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 670).
186 Child and Family Services Improvement Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-288, 120 Stat. 1233, § 6 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 629) (“[The Child and Family Services Reviews] also found a strong correlation
between frequent caseworker visits with children and positive outcomes for these children, such as timely
achievement of permanency and other indicators of child well-being.”); Child and Family Services Improvement
and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-34, 125 Stat. 369, § 101(c) (requiring states perform no less than 90% of
federally mandated caseworker visits).
187 STAFF OF H. WAYS & MEANS C OMM., supra note 162.
188
See, e.g., The Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-169, 113 Stat. 1822, § 121
(providing the states greater flexibility to put funding toward extending education, employment, and Medicaid
services to help youth successfully age out of foster care); Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing
Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-351, 122 Stat. 3949, § 201 (defining “child” so as to allow youth to
continue receiving foster care maintenance payments until their twenty-first birthday, provided they are in
school, employed, preparing for employment, or medically unable to seek education or employment); Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, § 5052 (allowing states to provide
independent living services up until the age of twenty-one for youth who aged out of foster care); Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, § 2955 (requiring states to educate
youth aging out of foster care about having a health care power of attorney or health care proxy).
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ensure children of a certain age are consulted in the formation and revision of
their permanency plan.189
However, even when federal legislation heightens the standard of care for
foster children, this legislation has proved disappointingly ineffective due to the
relatively low qualification standards levied on the states and the states’ options
to forego the funding in favor of noncompliance.190 To compound this problem,
individuals wishing to vindicate grievances against the foster care system under
Section 1983191 face a high threshold.192 These steep steps leading to the
courthouse door, paired with the relatively low standard of care required to
thwart a Section 1983 claim, render it unlikely that claimants will succeed in
vindicating violations of their rights in court.193 This difficulty, in conjunction
with the unpersuasive amount of monetary incentives attached to federal foster
care legislation, renders the protections discussed above inadequate to guard the
rights of the child in foster care.

189

Foster Care Bill of Rights, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/foster-care-bill-of-rights.aspx [hereinafter Foster Care Bill of
Rights] (describing how the Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act of 2014 requires child
welfare agencies ensure participation of foster children over the age of fourteen in their case plans, which also
must contain a description of the child’s rights).
190 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., FOSTER CARE: HHS NEEDS TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF FOSTERING
CONNECTIONS ACT IMPLEMENTATION 25 (2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-347.pdf; see, e.g., Emily
Palmer, How We Measured States’ Compliance With a Forgotten Federal Child Abuse Law, PROPUBLICA (Dec.
13, 2019, 8:59 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-measured-states-compliance-with-a-forgottenfederal-child-abuse-law (finding only thirteen states tracked compliance with CAPTA GAL requirements, and,
of those, only two provided representation to every child in a hearing).
191 “Section 1983 provides a private cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Strasser, supra note 86, at 225–26
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Yvonne L. by & through Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 959 F.2d
883, 886 (10th Cir. 1992)). To succeed in a Section 1983 claim, the claimant must prove the “state played an
important role in bringing about” the harm which comprises the subject of the complaint. Id. at 226.
192 The Court has limited the enforceability of Section 1983 claims against the states in the child welfare
context, mandating the plaintiff prove the state knew or suspected the perpetrating individual to pose a risk of
harm to the child. See id. at 232–33.
193 Though the Supreme Court has never explicitly delineated what showing of care is owed by the state to
foster children, some lower courts have guessed the professional judgment standard, rather than the more
permissive deliberate indifference standard, would apply. Compare Braam ex rel. v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 858
(Wash. 2003) (“[T]he proper inquiry [for a Section 1983 claim] is whether the State’s conduct falls substantially
short of the exercise of professional judgment, standards, or practices.”), with James ex rel. James v. Friend, 458
F.3d 726, 730 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Deliberate indifference will be found only if the officials were aware of facts
from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed and the officials actually
drew that inference.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). But see Strasser, supra note 86, at 226, 227 n.24
(noting several courts, including the Eight Circuit, have adopted a deliberate indifference, or a shock-theconscience, test to Section 1983 claims and pointing to several lower courts applying the deliberate indifference
standard to Section 1983 claims in the foster care context).
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From this survey of major federal legislation concerning the foster care
system, it is clear much of the policy revolves around monitoring the status of
foster children and providing them access to resources for success.194 This last
century of federal foster care legislation has oscillated between the sometimes
disharmonious concerns of family preservation and the prioritization of child
safety.195 While these legislative measures advocate for important improvements
in the foster care system, they largely fail to acknowledge the state of children’s
rights within the system.196 Instead, federal foster care legislation focuses
primarily on what children in foster care are entitled to passively receive, rather
than what substantive, active rights they possess while under state custody and
care.197 As a result, these federal statutes are not only an inadequate means of
protecting foster care youth from harm,198 but they also fail to properly account
for the individual rights and autonomy of the child in foster care.199

194 See generally CHILD WELFARE I NFO. GATEWAY & CHILD.’S BUREAU, MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
CONCERNED
WITH
CHILD
PROTECTION,
CHILD
WELFARE,
AND
ADOPTION
(2019),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/majorfedlegis.pdf (describing several provisions under the Fostering
Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 and listing several federal reporting requirements
and recommendations for states to provide programs and funding for initiatives such as healthcare, education,
and career services).
195 Child Welfare Info. Gateway, Concept and History of Permanency in U.S. Child Welfare, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH
&
HUM.
SERVS.,
ADMIN.
FOR
CHILD.
&
FAMILIES,
https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/permanency/overview/history/.
196 See Foster Care Bill of Rights, supra note 189.
197 See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (“The court may, in its discretion, appoint counsel for the child upon a
finding that such appointment is in the best interest of the child.”). Thus, even among the “gold standard” of
child welfare laws, children are not guaranteed the right to an attorney, much less decision-making authority.
About ICWA, NAT’L INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASS’ N, https://www.nicwa.org/about-icwa/ (last visited Oct. 15,
2022).
198 See, e.g., Reese Oxner, Texas Foster Care Children Exposed to Sexual Abuse, Given Wrong Medication
and Neglected in Unlicensed Placements, New Report Says, TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 14, 2021, 3:00 PM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2021/09/14/texas-foster-care-children/ (describing egregious harm to children in
foster care amidst the confusions of the COVID-19 pandemic); Allegra Abramo, Despite Court Order, WA
Foster
Care
System
Still
Out
of
Compliance,
CROSSCUT
(Aug.
12,
2021),
https://crosscut.com/news/2021/08/despite-court-order-wa-foster-care-system-still-out-compliance (describing
Washington’s lack of compliance with state and federal foster care legislation, resulting in unsafe conditions for
children in the state’s foster care system); Jennifer Huber & Bill Grimm, Most States Fail to Meet the Mental
Health Needs of Foster Children, NAT’L CTR. FOR YOUTH L. (Dec. 31, 2004),
https://youthlaw.org/publication/most-states-fail-to-meet-the-mental-health-needs-of-foster-children/
(discussing the detriment to youth in foster care resulting from the lack of compliance with the minimum
standards of mental healthcare set forth by federal legislation).
199 See Young Adults Formerly in Foster Care: Challenges and Solutions, YOUTH.GOV,
https://youth.gov/youth-briefs/foster-care-youth-brief/challenges (last visited Oct. 15, 2022).
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B. State Foster Care Legislation
The shortcomings to federal legislation in the child welfare context,
however, are not fatal to the foster child’s rights. Family law, the child welfare
system, and the foster care system are largely the responsibility of the states, and
federal laws serve to set a minimum standard, rather than a ceiling, on what
rights and protections states may provide.200 However, when it comes to foster
child autonomy, states largely fail to make up for the rights gap in the foster
child’s life.201 A majority of states do not provide significantly more, if any,
decision-making authority or personal autonomy to children in foster care than
the federal legislation discussed above.202 This section will briefly examine
variations in child welfare laws across states, focusing particularly on different
models of child representation.
Every state has specific statutory provisions governing its own foster care
system. These provisions can differ broadly on matters such as the best interests
of the child standard,203 involuntary termination of parental rights,204 and
background check requirements prior to kinship placements.205 Moreover, when
200 Linda
D. Elrod, The Federalization of Family Law, ABA (July 1, 2009),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol36_20
09/summer2009/the_federalization_of_family_law/ (tracing the uptick in federalization of family law while still
recognizing that family law, and especially child welfare, has historically been an area of the law left to the
states).
201 See id.
202 See, e.g., Strassburger, supra note 23, at 1135 (“[N]o state allows all young people to make all of their
own medical decisions.”); Amy Reichbach & Marlies Spanjaard, Guarding the Schoolhouse Gate: Protecting
the Educational Rights of Children in Foster Care, 21 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 101, 103, 110 (2011) (noting
foster children are often unable to challenge their school suspensions or expulsions effectively—partially due to
a lack of effective advocacy by an adult—leading to higher rates of expulsion than peers and a risk of severe
long-term impact on the likelihood of successful transition to adulthood); Matthew M. Cummings, Sedating
Forgotten Children: How Unnecessary Psychotropic Medication Endangers Foster Children’s Rights and
Health, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 357, 361–62 (2012) (describing the overuse of mind-altering prescriptions for
children in foster care and arguing the foster child’s lack of medical advocacy rights contributes to this problem).
203 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY & CHILD.’S BUREAU, DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD, supra note 28, at 2–4. Only twenty-two states lay out specific factors for courts to consider when applying
the best interests of the child standard. Id. at 2. Moreover, while some states instruct courts to consider factors
such as emotional ties and visitation with family members, other states explicitly prohibit courts from
considering factors such as sex or disability. Id. at 2–4. Only twelve states and the District of Columbia
specifically instruct courts to consider the express wishes of the child. Id. at 4.
204 CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY & CHILD.’S BUREAU, GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 2–4 (2021), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/groundtermin.pdf. For
instance, five states prohibit involuntary termination of parental rights for the sole reason that a parent could not
provide adequate care due to poverty, while three states and Puerto Rico specify parental rights cannot be
terminated solely due to legitimate practice of religious beliefs. Id. at 4.
205 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY & CHILD.’S BUREAU, BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR PROSPECTIVE
FOSTER, ADOPTIVE, AND KINSHIP CAREGIVERS, supra note 68, at 2–4.
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it comes to the child’s ability to participate in making decisions that affect their
everyday life, the laws of each state vary even more. For instance, in Delaware,
the child has an explicit right to be notified about, and participate in, any court
hearings and to speak to the judge regarding decisions that may have an impact
on the child’s life.206 Similarly, in California, the child has a right to be involved
in their own case plan, including placement decisions, permanency, and the
child’s gender identity.207 On the other end of the spectrum, some state laws
make no mention of consulting with the child when formulating a case plan. 208
Since states have principal authority to create their own child welfare laws, a
foster child’s experience in one state may differ significantly from the
experience of a similarly situated child sitting across the state line.209
One area of the law particularly susceptible to this jurisdictional variance is
found in the context of child representation before the court. As mentioned
previously, states are required under CAPTA to appoint representation for
children in abuse and neglect proceedings.210 However, representation of the
child in this context can occur in different ways.
First, the most common representation scheme—utilized in some form by
forty-one states—requires states to appoint a GAL to represent the best interests
of the child.211 While this model ensures that there is an advocate for the child
present during abuse and neglect proceedings, many states do not require the
GAL to be an attorney,212 while others fail to specify training prerequisites for
the GAL.213 Moreover, this model runs the risk of allowing the GAL—whether
intentionally or unintentionally—to unduly impose their own thoughts,
opinions, and beliefs and advocate for a position that fails to properly voice the
child’s wishes.214 Furthermore, the traditional best-interests-centered GAL

206

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 2522(a)(10) (West 2022); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-G:20 (2018).
CAL. WELF. & I NST. CODE § 16001.9(37) (West 2019).
208 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-27 (2022) (failing to require the child’s presence, involvement,
opinion, or approval in the formation of the child’s case plan); IDAHO CODE § 16-1621 (2011) (requiring only
the child’s GAL and attorney be given copies of the child’s case plan and notified of the planning hearing to
adopt the case plan, but not the child).
209 See supra notes 203–205 and accompanying text.
210 42 U.S.C. § 5106(a)(2)(B).
211 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY & CHILD.’S BUREAU, REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS, supra note 169, at 2.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 3–4.
214 Steven C. Teske & Melissa Dorris Carter, The Next Generation of Child Advocacy: Protecting the Best
Interest of Children by Promoting a Child’s Right to Counsel in Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, 13 GA. BAR J.
22, 24–26 (2007).
207
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model can create issues with confidentiality between the child and the GAL. 215
Even if the GAL is an attorney, the GAL is not necessarily bound by the typical
rules of attorney-client privilege,216 and, in many ways, is acting as an agent of
both the court and the child simultaneously.217 Thus, though the GAL model
aims to achieve child representation in all abuse and neglect proceedings, this
model does not always guarantee adequate representation of the foster child.
Second, and in contrast to the GAL model, some states appoint a traditional
attorney (what this Comment calls a “child-centered attorney”) to represent the
express wishes of the child in abuse and neglect proceedings.218 In this model,
the child-centered attorney maintains a traditional attorney-client relationship
with the child and advocates for their explicit wishes if the child is old enough
to express such wishes.219 Sixteen states require the appointment of a childcentered attorney, and eight states require the appointment of both a childcentered attorney and a GAL.220
A third common protection for the foster care child in court proceedings is
the appointment of a CASA. A CASA is a volunteer who may be appointed by
the court to investigate the child’s circumstances and provide recommendations
for living situations and services that better serve the child’s needs. 221 While a
CASA can also function as the child’s GAL, the two roles are not necessarily
the same under every state system.222 Some states assign the CASA to assist the
court, while others designate the CASA as the child’s GAL. 223 Like the GAL
and the child-centered attorney, the CASA need not be the only party
representing the child, and some states allow for the appointment of a CASA in
addition to a GAL or child-centered attorney.224
215

See id.
See, e.g., People v. Gabriesheski, 262 P.3d 653, 659–60 (Colo. 2011) (holding that attorney-client
privilege did not apply to a child’s statements made to her GAL in an abuse and dependency proceeding).
217 See Robinson, supra note 50, at 412–13 (discussing the need for clarification of the GAL role as either
fact finder for the court or champion for the child, but rejecting the idea that both roles can be adequately
performed by the same person).
218 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY & CHILD.’S BUREAU, REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS, supra note 169, at 2; see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-16(c)(6) (2022)
(providing that, if the child’s requests differ from those advocated by the GAL, the court shall appoint a separate
attorney for the child if it finds doing so is in the child’s best interests).
219 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-103(c) (2022) (noting that an attorney appointed to a child in an abuse
or neglect proceeding owes the child the duties of attorney-client privilege as imposed by Georgia law).
220 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY & CHILD.’S BUREAU, REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS, supra note 169, at 2.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 See id. at 2–3.
224 See id. at 2.
216
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It is clear from these varying configurations that the system for child
representation in abuse and neglect proceedings can differ significantly from
state to state. In some states, a child may only be represented by a non-attorney
CASA volunteer who advocates for the child’s best interests, while in other
states the child may be appointed a child-centered attorney who advocates for
the child’s wishes in addition to a CASA or GAL who advocates for the child’s
best interests.225 This latter model provides far more robust support for the foster
child, since the child’s legal interests and wishes are represented before the
court.226 By contrast, the former model runs the risk of drowning out the child’s
voice with the sole representation of a CASA or GAL who may lack legal
training and misconstrue the best interests model to advocate for a position
entirely different than the child’s own wishes.227
C. Return to the Rights Gap: What Can Be Done?
As the above Parts illustrate, both the constitutional rights for foster children
recognized by the Court and the additional rights afforded by federal and state
legislation are passive rights—children’s rights to receive care and certain
standards of treatment. However, legislation and jurisprudence recognize very
few active rights—children’s rights to exercise decision-making authority.
This situation yields a “rights gap” in the life of the child in foster care. As
the law stands, deference to parental rights, together with recognition of the
state’s parens patriae authority over the lives of children, “operate to reinforce
and justify the paternalistic treatment of children as less than full constitutional
rights-holders.”228 However, for the child in foster care, this alreadyquestionable equation is even more off-balance. In that situation, the legal parent
is unable to exercise their parental rights due to their absence or a court’s finding
of parental unfitness, so the state steps further into the life of the child to exercise
greater parens patriae authority.229
New variables enter the equation as well. The state introduces a number of
other actors into the foster child’s world who hold varying degrees of authority
over the child’s life, such as the foster care agency, case worker, and foster
225

Id.
See Jesica Matthews Eames, Comment, Seen But Not Heard: Advocating for the Legal Representation
of a Child’s Expressed Wish in Protection Proceedings and Recommendations for New Standards in Georgia,
48 EMORY L.J. 1431, 1438 (1999).
227 Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1314 (1996).
228 Dailey, supra note 18, at 2113.
229 Curtis, supra note 52, at 166.
226
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parent.230 However, none of these parties hold the same autonomy and unity of
rights as the legal parent.231 Thus, the foster child is left with a fractured
patchwork of rights-holders who are often subject to an added layer of
government bureaucracy and, at times, are unsympathetic to even the reasonable
desires and wishes of the child.232 Moreover, while legal parents in traditional,
intact families may gradually choose to cede autonomy to the child as they grow
older and more mature,233 the child in foster care is not always afforded these
privileges due to a lack of recognition of the child’s own voice under federal and
most state schemes.234
While the issues presented by this patchwork are complex and demand
correspondingly complex solutions, one starting point is to increase the
protection of foster children’s procedural rights and access to the courts. While
some commentators suggest this protection can be achieved by allowing
children the individual right to file suit on their own behalf,235 this Comment
focuses primarily on (1) providing each child with the guarantee of a childcentered attorney who advocates for the child’s express wishes; and (2)
implementing the mature minor doctrine to better evaluate the child’s decisions.
While the idea of child-centered representation has been discussed by scholars
in the context of abuse and neglect proceedings,236 the following Part contends
that similar representation could be applicable to other areas of decision-making
in the life of the foster child, ensuring a means for the child to exercise more
active rights. The child-centered attorney not only serves as a voice for the child,
but also as a means of filling in the rights gap created by the foster child’s
230 See Fleegle, supra note 9, at 521 (“[T]he Court in OFFER apparently mapped a course of judicial
restraint in this delicate and complex area by not deciding definitively whether the foster family has a liberty
interest. But the Court does say that whatever interest, if any, the foster family may have is limited by the statutes
which create the family, and even more limited when in direct confrontation with the natural parents’ interests.”).
231 See supra Section I.E.
232 The U.S. Supreme Court itself has said as much in its continual affirmation of parental rights when pitted
against state power—parental rights win out largely because of the parents’ ability to contribute to the child’s
moral and social formation in a way that escapes the state’s own ability. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”
(citation omitted)); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
233 Barnett, supra note 108, at 265 (drawing a positive correlation between learning to make rational,
autonomous choices during youth and successful educational, social, and employment outcomes later in life).
234 See supra Part III.
235 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 50, at 396 (“Allowing children standing to bring actions in their own
names is one part of the solution to the problems plaguing the foster care system today.”).
236 See, e.g., Matthews Eames, supra note 226, at 1474–76 (arguing for the adoption of child-centered
attorneys in abuse and neglect proceedings); Teske & Carter, supra note 214, at 26 (same, in custody
proceedings); Lauren Girard Adams, Lourdes M. Rosado & Angela C. Vigil, What Difference Can a Quality
Lawyer Make for a Child?, 38 LITIG. 29, 35 (2011) (same, in dependency and delinquency proceedings).

2022]

DID ANYONE ASK THE CHILD?

421

uniquely vulnerable status outside the bounds of traditional parental care. The
following Part offers a solution to this issue, magnifying the child’s voice
through increased recognition of the mature minor doctrine and the guarantee of
child-centered representation.
IV. BRIDGING THE GAP: USING THE MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE AND CHILDCENTERED REPRESENTATION TO AMPLIFY CHILDREN’S VOICES
This Part advances a practicable solution to the foster child’s rights gap. It
proposes a two-pronged solution that would increase existing procedural
protections and would ensure the foster child’s voice is heard in matters relating
to their own care, activities, and custody. The first prong asserts that state and
juvenile courts should adopt the mature minor doctrine and expand the doctrine
beyond the medical context. This expansion would provide a framework for
judges to use when assessing the wishes of the foster child who petitions the
court for decision-making authority relating to their own care.
The second prong contends that states should adopt the ABA’s Model Act
Governing the Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency
Proceedings (“Model Act”)237 as a mechanism for ensuring every child has the
right to a child-centered attorney. The Model Act should be expanded to (1)
provide for the appointment of a child-centered attorney in proceedings where
the child seeks to petition the court for decision-making authority under the
mature minor doctrine; and (2) require the child-centered attorney to appoint a
best-interests advocate for the child when the attorney feels the child’s wishes
are not in alignment with the child’s best interests.
If judiciaries and legislatures adopt this two-pronged solution, the rights gap
may finally start to narrow: the child can supplement their lack of parental
oversight by advocating for their own wishes.
A. Changes from the Bench: Use and Expansion of the Mature Minor
Doctrine
This section explains how if the first prong of this Comment’s solution is
adopted, judiciaries will be in a better position to help alleviate the plight of
children in the foster care system. By recognizing and expanding the framework
of the mature minor doctrine beyond the medical context, judges can recognize
the child’s authority as a viable decision-maker in situations where the child has
237 ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILD. IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY
PROCEEDINGS (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
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proven themselves to be sufficiently mature. This affirmation of the mature
child’s right to decide would enable the child to exercise their autonomy to a
greater degree than the system currently allows.
As discussed in Part II, the mature minor doctrine permits minors who have
proven themselves sufficiently well-informed and reasonable to make medical
decisions for themselves.238 The Court itself has applied the mature minor
doctrine in cases concerning a minor’s right to an abortion—it combined the
doctrine with use of a judicial bypass procedure that allows a judge to grant a
minor’s request to obtain an abortion without notifying or receiving consent
from their legal parents.239
Though the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the application of the
mature minor doctrine to other areas of law, lower courts have applied the
doctrine in a number of situations to both affirm and deny the minor’s right to
give or withhold consent for medical treatment.240 In their application of the
mature minor doctrine, courts have recognized minors’ capabilities to make
significant decisions, even those with life-altering consequences.241
The crucial premise of the mature minor doctrine is that some minors do
possess the requisite intelligence, experience, knowledge, and rational
capabilities to make their own decisions, and this premise holds true even where
decisions have legal repercussions. 242 This Comment further asserts that the
validity of this premise should not be confined to the medical context. Rather,
this notion can, and should, be expanded to other areas of a minor’s life to
238

See supra Section II.A.1.
See supra Section II.A.1.
240 See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 328 (Ill. 1989) (“[W]e find that a mature minor may exercise a
common law right to consent to or refuse medical care . . . .”); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 748–49
(Tenn. 1987) (adopting the mature minor exception and designating the question of whether a minor possesses
the capacity to consent to medical treatment as a question for the jury); Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr.,
422 S.E.2d 827, 838 (W. Va. 1992) (recognizing the mature minor doctrine as an exception to the common law
requirement of parental consent for underage patients); Baird v. Att’y Gen., 360 N.E.2d 288, 296 (Mass. 1977)
(suggesting the mature minor rule might apply in situations where the best interests of the child would not be
served by notifying the parents of a child’s medical treatment and the minor is capable of giving consent).
241
See, e.g., In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1206 (Me. 1990) (upholding a minor’s right to refuse lifesustaining medical treatment based on the minor’s express wishes indicated prior to an accident that left him in
a permanent vegetative state); In re Rena, 705 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (determining that a
juvenile court was incorrect in failing to consider the interests of a mature minor before ordering a blood
transfusion in defiance of the minor’s wishes and emphasizing the need to hear testimony from the minor herself
on the issue, not only that of her attorney and parents).
242 Ikuta, supra note 133, at 198–99. Further, courts have recognized minors’ ability to make decisions with
a “mature state of mind” for years in the criminal context by allowing for the prosecution of minors as adults in
certain situations. Kurt J. Pritz, Development of the Doctrine of Mature Minority as a Defense to States’ Power
of Parens Patriae, 12 J. JUV. L. 139, 140 (1991); see also supra note 115 and accompanying text.
239
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provide courts a framework through which to analyze a foster child’s right to
make decisions. The Court’s affirmation that “[c]onstitutional rights do not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined
age of majority” reinforces the idea that children, and particularly mature
children, are constitutional rights-holders who have the capability to make
decisions and exercise autonomy.243
Application of the mature minor doctrine outside the medical context
provides a tried-and-true precedent that courts can apply to the reasonable
decisions made by the mature youth in foster care, even in instances where a
child’s decisions differ from those of their caretaker or caseworker. In such
instances, the child—if proven sufficiently mature and understanding of the
decision at issue—could be granted the right to make those decisions for
themselves by means of a judicial bypass, overriding the need for consent from
a third party and affirming the child’s decision.
Further, the mature minor doctrine allows courts to give serious
consideration to a minor’s own deeply held beliefs in a way the best interests of
the child standard does not.244 While the best interests of the child standard
focuses primarily on the outcome of the decision, the mature minor doctrine
vindicates the rights of the minor by turning the court’s attention to the minor’s
own wishes, thought process, and ability to decide for themselves.245 In the
context of the foster child, the decision at stake would not always carry the same
immense consequences as the medical decisions often contemplated under the
mature minor doctrine,246 but rather, may include the child’s reasonable wish to
increase visitation with siblings or biological family members, enroll in a new
extracurricular activity, or try a different psychiatric medication with lesser side
effects.
Moreover, use of the mature minor doctrine in the foster care context would
alleviate some of the arbitrary nature of the age-of-majority threshold. Although
the full rights and responsibilities of adulthood do not vest until an individual

243

Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 325 (Ill. 1990) (applying the mature minor doctrine and determining a
seventeen-year-old minor could withhold consent for a blood transfusion based on her religious beliefs); Josh
Burk, Note, Mature Minors, Medical Choice, and the Constitutional Right to Martyrdom, 102 VA. L. REV. 1355,
1381–82 (2016) (noting that “empowerment rights . . . improv[e] children’s experiences by recognizing and
remedying their powerlessness,” whereas protecting children because they are vulnerable “disadvantages”
them).
245 See supra notes 134–135 and accompanying text.
246 See, e.g., supra note 241.
244

424

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:385

reaches eighteen,247 the reality is that minors mature at vastly different rates,248
often partially accelerated by early, traumatic life experiences. 249 In the case of
the child in foster care, such trauma is often present due to the mere experience
of being removed from their legal parent,250 and life circumstances may force
these children to grow up fast. Use of the mature minor doctrine to allow foster
children to take on some measure of decision-making responsibility for
themselves could help reduce the arbitrariness of this age threshold by
recognizing the dignity and capability of mature minors to make decisions
regarding their own care.251
Though the criteria for determining a minor’s maturity differs among
jurisdictions,252 the standard factors—age, ability, education, training,
experience, sensibility, and appreciation for the risks and consequence of the
decision—would likely apply to any decision the child in foster care might wish
to make.253 Courts also could adjust the requisite showing of maturity in
proportion to the gravity of the decision at stake. For instance, a foster care youth
wishing to take a certain acne medication or dye their hair against the wishes of
their foster parent or caseworker would require a lower showing of maturity than
a similar youth wishing to undergo a sex reassignment surgery or obtain an
abortion. In this way, the finality and severity of the decision at stake could
inform the threshold of maturity required to grant the child a judicial bypass.
Moreover, the administrative requirements and formality of the judicial bypass
process would help ensure the decision was not too impulsive, but instead was a
decision that was important enough to the minor that they chose to plead their
case before a judge.

247

See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 39-1-1(a) (2022) (setting eighteen as the age of majority in Georgia).
Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1115 (2012) (describing maturity as a “cultural
construct” and noting individuals are shaped more by their daily lives and cultural norms than by legal
thresholds).
249 Imi Lo, Did You Have to Grow Up Too Soon?: Healing from the Trauma of Parentification, PSYCH.
TODAY (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/living-emotional-intensity/201912/didyou-have-grow-too-soon (describing the effects of “parentificiation”—the phenomenon in which the child takes
on the role of caring for his or her own parent, siblings, or other individuals—as often forcing the acceleration
of ordinary growth cycles, thus forcing the child to “grow up too quickly”).
250 See Wald, supra note 12, at 8.
251 Benston, supra note 136, at 14–15.
252 Id. at 3.
253 See, e.g., Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 748 (Tenn. 1987) (using these factors to determine a
minor’s maturity); see also In re Doe, 973 So. 2d 548, 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (laying out a list of factors
for judges to consider when making a determination of a minor’s maturity to obtain an abortion, such as: “the
minor’s emotional or physical needs; the possibility of intimidation, other emotional injury, or physical danger
to the minor;” and others).
248
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The considerations above demonstrate the utility of expanding the mature
minor doctrine beyond its current medical confines so it may serve as a
mechanism for judges to recognize and effectuate the decision-making authority
of youth in foster care. Though not a complete remedy for the rights gap,
implementation of the mature minor doctrine in state and juvenile courts will
provide a vital forum for the foster child to plead their case. The child can prove
themselves capable of making such decisions, advocate on their own behalf, and
experience a sense of fairness in the process.
B. The True Child Advocate: New Standards for Child Advocacy
This section reiterates the need for a child-centered attorney in court
proceedings, framing the Model Act as a viable solution to the deficient state
and federal child representation laws currently in effect. It further argues for
expansion of the Model Act to include legal matters outside abuse and neglect
proceedings. The foster child should be granted the right to a child-centered
attorney in other matters where the child may wish to petition the court for
decision-making authority, thus maximizing the Model Act’s potential for
closing the rights gap.
In the United States, the right to an attorney has long been recognized as an
integral part of fair representation before the court, at least in criminal
proceedings.254 To send a child into a proceeding where potentially life-altering
decisions will be made without the protection of an attorney advocating for the
child’s wishes fails to comport with this long-held standard in American
jurisprudence.255 However, this scenario is the reality for thousands of children
in the foster care system.256 Despite the federal requirement that children are
appointed a GAL for all abuse and neglect proceedings,257 many states interpret
this broad provision to allow for representation by a non-attorney GAL
254

See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932) (“The right to be heard would be, in many
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.”); see also In re Gault 387 U.S. 1, 38 n.65 (1967)
(“[The rights guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment] have substantial meaning for the overwhelming majority of
persons brought before the juvenile court only if they are provided with competent lawyers who can invoke those
rights effectively.” (citations omitted)).
255 Adams, Rosado & Vigil, supra note 236, at 31 (describing the high stakes of child dependency
proceedings and maintaining “[w]e would never tolerate an adult going into that situation without an attorney”).
256 See CHILD.’S ADVOC. INST. & FIRST STAR, A CHILD’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD
ON
LEGAL
REPRESENTATION
FOR
ABUSED
&
NEGLECTED
CHILDREN
10,
http://www.caichildlaw.org/Misc/3rd_Ed_Childs_Right_to_Counsel.pdf [hereinafter A CHILD’S RIGHT TO
COUNSEL] (“Only 31% of states currently mandate the appointment of client-directed representation for the child
[in abuse and neglect proceedings].”).
257 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii).
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advocating only for the child’s best interests.258 Such schemes not only barely
scrape past the minimum requirements of federal mandates, but, more
importantly, they rob the child of their right to counsel in a proceeding that has
the potential to upend the child’s entire life.259
Child advocates have long urged that a child’s right to an attorney in abuse
and neglect proceedings is vital to good outcomes for children in foster care and
necessary to adequately safeguard the foster child’s fundamental due process
rights.260 However, many state legislatures have been slow to respond to this
call,261 and federal law still requires only a GAL appointment, with few
additional specifications.262 In response to the pleas of child advocates and in
hopes of prompting more state legislatures to strengthen their child
representation laws, in 2011, the ABA adopted a model statute exemplifying the
mechanics of child-centered representation in abuse and neglect proceedings.263
The Model Act consists of twelve sections addressing everything from the
qualifications of a child-centered attorney to payment of attorneys’ fees.264 The
Model Act defines “[a]buse and neglect proceeding[s]” broadly to encompass
matters relating to abuse, neglect, dependency, voluntary placement of children
in state care, termination of parental rights, permanency hearings, and posttermination of parental rights proceedings.265 This definition extends the right to
an attorney to children voluntarily given over to foster care,266 while, in contrast,
258 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.820(1) (2022) (“‘Guardian ad litem’ [is defined as] . . . a duly certified
volunteer, a staff member, a staff attorney, . . . a pro bono attorney . . . ; a court-appointed attorney; or a
responsible adult who is appointed by the court to represent the best interests of a child . . . .”); FLA. STAT. §
39.822(1) (2022) (requiring the appointment of a GAL to represent children in abuse, abandonment, or neglect
judicial proceedings).
259 Adams, Rosado & Vigil, supra note 236, at 30–31.
260 See id. at 35; see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO
REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES, AM. BAR. ASS’N 23–24 (1996),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/family_law/committees/standards_abuseneglect.
pdf (listing six different resolutions from 1979 to 1992 urging the adoption of statutes requiring counsel for
children in abuse and neglect proceedings).
261 See A CHILD’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, supra note 256, at 7–8, 132–33.
262 Beth Locker & Melissa Dorris, A Child’s Right to Legal Representation in Georgia Abuse and Neglect
Proceedings, 10 GA. BAR J. 12, 13 (2004).
263 ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILD. IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY
PROCEEDINGS (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
264 Id. §§ 4, 9, 12.
265 Id. § 1(a).
266 Id. § 3(a). According to a 2020 report compiled by the Children’s Bureau, 1,919 children entered the
foster care system due to parental relinquishment, 4,736 entered due to the child’s own drug abuse problems,
and 2,147 entered due to the death of a parent. ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES: CHILD.’S BUREAU, THE
AFCARS REPORT, supra note 6, at 2. Children who enter the system due to these causes—where abuse or neglect
may not be an issue—are not entitled to the appointment of an attorney or even a GAL under some state schemes.
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CAPTA and most state statutes only require the appointment of a child’s
representative for foster children who enter the system due to abuse or neglect.267
Moreover, though the Model Act welcomes appointment of a best-interests
advocate for the child,268 the Model Act explicitly requires the appointment of a
child-centered attorney who will represent the child in accordance with “[t]he
applicable rules of professional conduct and any law governing the obligations
of lawyers to their clients.”269 Additionally, the Model Act’s requirements
extend beyond courtroom professional responsibilities. The Model Act
recommends the child-centered attorney take a more active role in ensuring the
child-client receives adequate care, encouraging the attorney to take “necessary
legal action regarding the child’s medical, mental health, social, education, and
overall well-being.”270
Further emphasizing the child-centered attorney as advocate and confidant,
the Model Act requires application of attorney-client privilege to the relationship
between the attorney and child,271 with only appropriately limited exceptions if
the child reveals information placing them at substantial risk of harm.272 This
confidential aspect of the relationship is key, since some children, like adults,
may feel more comfortable revealing information when they are assured
confidentiality. This allows the child-centered attorney to serve as a better and
more informed advocate.273
The Model Act also addresses the attorney’s role in advocating for children
of “diminished capacity”—including infant and pre-verbal children—providing
standards by which the attorney should make a determination of diminished
capacity, and requiring them to advocate from a substituted judgment standard274
See ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILD. IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY
PROCEEDINGS § 3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
267 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii); FLA. STAT. §§ 39.820(1), 39.822(1) (2022).
268 ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILD. IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY
PROCEEDINGS § 3(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
269 Id. § 3(d). The Model Act emphasizes the strict separation between the role of the child-centered attorney
and the role of the best interests advocate, maintaining the same individual should never serve in both roles. See
id. § 7(e) cmt.
270 Id. § 7(b)(7).
271 Id. § 8(b).
272 Id. § 7(e). The Model Act is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the child-centered attorney can take
such action if the child is not found to have “diminished capacity.” Id. The Model Act should be clarified to
ensure the child’s lawyer may take such action regardless of the child’s capacity if the lawyer feels the child is
at a substantial risk of harm.
273 See Adams, Rosado & Vigil, supra note 236, at 33.
274 ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILD. IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY
PROCEEDINGS § 7(d) (AM. BAR ASS’ N 2011). The Model Act notes a substituted judgment standard “involves
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in such situations, rather than a best interests of the child standard.275 This
provision supplies a helpful and functional framework for attorneys working
with younger children or youths who may have trouble articulating their wishes
due to physical or developmental issues. Moreover, the Model Act encourages
the attorney to evaluate a child’s ability to express their reasonable choices on
an issue-by-issue basis so that the attorney can represent the child’s wishes on
at least some issues, even if the child is unable to make a rational decision on
other matters in contention.276
Finally, the Model Act encourages the child’s active participation and
presence at all proceedings in the case,277 requiring the child-centered attorney
to explain the case and proceedings to the child and elicit the child’s wishes in a
developmentally appropriate manner.278 Moreover, if the child-centered attorney
disagrees with the child’s stance on an issue, the attorney is to serve as counselor
to them, while taking care not to “unduly influenc[e] the child[’s decision].”279
Overall, the Model Act provides a thorough framework for robust, childcentered advocacy for youth in foster care. The presence of an attorney in these
proceedings is a necessary protection for the foster child’s rights, particularly
given the gravity of the interests at stake.280 Families are subject to
reorganization and children run the risk of being removed from their homes with
the possibility of becoming “legal strangers” to the only parents they have ever
known.281 Given the nature of these proceedings and the vulnerable position of
children in foster care, a child-centered attorney is vital to ensuring the child’s
interests are properly represented.
This Comment further urges that the Model Act be amended to provide
increased protection for the child in situations where the child-centered attorney
substantially disagrees with the child-client. In such situations, the attorney
determining what the child would decide if he or she were able to make an adequately considered decision.” Id.
§ 7(d) cmt. Such determinations should be “based on objective facts and information, not personal beliefs” and
should “assess the needs and interests of this child . . . [by] observ[ing] the child in his or her environment, and
consult[ing] with experts.” Id. (emphasis added).
275 Id. § 7(d).
276
Id. § 7(d) cmt. For instance, a child may be able to decide between two potential kinship caregivers to
determine the child’s preferred placement, but not about whether the child wishes to remain at their current
school or be transferred to a school closer to the child’s new place of residence. In such situations, the childcentered attorney should advocate for the child’s wishes with regard to kinship placement but apply a substituted
judgment standard when advocating for the child’s school placement.
277 Id. § 9(a).
278 Id. § 7(c).
279 Id. § 7(c) cmt.
280 See Adams, Rosado & Vigil, supra note 236, at 30–31.
281 Locker & Dorris, supra note 262, at 14.
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could request appointment of an additional representative to advocate for the
child’s best interests.282 Though the Model Act currently allows for such an
appointment,283 it should be amended to require that the child-centered attorney
take this step in situations where the attorney feels the child’s wishes could be
of ultimate harm to the child. Such a provision would further mitigate the risk of
the court making a ruling that might be unintentionally harmful to the child.
Though the presence of a child-centered attorney in abuse and neglect
proceedings is of primary importance, such proceedings are not the only legal
processes where the child-centered attorney could be of use. While the Model
Act alludes to the attorney’s role beyond the abuse and neglect sphere, 284 this
portion of the Model Act is unclear and should be amended to explicitly provide
for continuation of the attorney’s duties in judicial bypass proceedings. The
Model Act could be expanded to allow the child-centered attorney to counsel
and advocate for the child in situations where the child petitions the court for the
right to make certain decisions regarding the child’s care. These situations may
include decisions such as a child’s gender identity, mental health treatment,
physical appearance, extracurricular activities, visitation, and numerous other
issues.
Under current federal and state law, children are given varying ranges of
control over such subjects, often with hard-line age thresholds for decisionmaking.285 In most scenarios though, the foster parent or caseworker is given the
282

This scheme has already been implemented in several states and ensures greater protection for the child
in situations where the child-centered attorney may feel the child’s wishes are not in the child’s own best
interests. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-129(a)(2)(D) (2021) (requiring the court to appoint a best-interests
advocate for the child when the child’s wishes differ from what the child-centered attorney finds to be in the
child’s best interests and specifying the best-interests advocate need not be an attorney).
283 ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILD. IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY
PROCEEDINGS § 7(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
284 The Model Act notes that the child-centered attorney should also be involved in “investigating and taking
necessary legal action regarding the child’s medical, mental health, social, education, and overall well-being.”
Id. § 7(b)(7). While this provision is broad and could encompass the types of judicial bypass proceedings
recommended in this Comment, such an extension of the attorney’s role is not necessarily intuitive from the
words of the Model Act. This provision should be clarified to ensure the attorney is involved in such matters and
to formulate a process for the foster child to have increased access to the courts for judicial bypass proceedings.
See id. § 7(b)(7) & cmt.
285 See, e.g., Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, Pub. L. No. 113-183, 128 Stat.
1928, § 113(a) (ensuring children in foster care age fourteen or older participate in the development of their case
plans); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-529(B) (2022) (granting a number of additional rights to foster children over the
age of sixteen, such as the right to adult living classes, a hearing on the child’s capacity to make medical
decisions, and the right to receive help obtaining a driver’s license with the foster parent’s approval); CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 16001.9(a)(25) (West 2019) (granting children over the age of twelve the opportunity “to choose,
when[] feasible,” their own healthcare provider and “to communicate with that healthcare provider” about
treatment options).
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ultimate say over such decisions, leaving the child with little control over the
most basic aspects of their own life.286 The attorney’s presence in such
proceedings, paired with implementation of the mature minor doctrine, could
allow the foster child to successfully petition the court for a judicial bypass
regarding key decisions, thus providing the foster child greater autonomy.
This section has argued for adoption of the Model Act by state legislatures.
The adoption of the Model Act would protect the foster child’s right to counsel
in abuse, neglect, and judicial bypass proceedings, thereby extending the duties
of the child-centered attorney to encompass such proceedings. Moreover, the
Model Act should be amended to provide explicitly for the appointment of a
best-interests advocate for the child in situations where the child-centered
attorney feels the child’s expressed wishes substantially deviate from the child’s
best interests. Through adoption of this amended Model Act, states could
provide robust representation for the child in foster care, guaranteeing the child
an advocate for their expressed wishes and protecting the child’s rights.
Moreover, if jurisdictions adopt the Model Act in conjunction with expanding
the mature minor doctrine outside of the medical context, the combination of
these two guarantees would allow the minor not only a basis for pleading their
case before the court, but adequate legal representation in the process.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF ASKING THE CHILD
This Part discusses the limitations and implications of the solution proposed
above. Though the Model Act provides a well-researched and thorough scheme
for child representation, and the mature minor doctrine has been successfully
applied by courts for decades,287 these solutions nonetheless have limits. Critics
may express concerns about the costs of appointing child-centered attorneys, the
potential drain on judicial resources, the subjectivity of the mature minor
doctrine, and the possibility that giving children such a degree of autonomy may
infringe upon fundamental parental rights. This Part addresses each of these
concerns in turn. Such potential limitations can be overcome by careful statutory
implementation and, ultimately, must fall secondary to the interests of the child
at stake.
First, opponents of the proposed solution may argue that appointment of a
child-centered attorney, and possibly of an additional best-interests advocate, is
286 See, e.g., FOSTER PARENT MANUAL, supra note 69, at 8 (noting the foster parents’ rights to be involved
in decisions regarding the child and listing the foster agency’s right to make placement decisions for the child;
remove the child from their foster home; and “[a]rrange for the child’s medical, dental, and psychological care”).
287 See, e.g., supra note 240 and accompanying text.
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unsustainably expensive. However, all states are already required by CAPTA to
appoint a GAL for any child in abuse and neglect proceedings. 288 Adoption of
the Model Act would not require appointment of an additional individual unless
the jurisdiction provided only volunteer, non-attorney GALs, or the childcentered attorney felt the child’s expressed wishes were divergent from the
child’s best interests. In this latter scenario, the child-centered attorney would
request appointment of a best-interests advocate, who could be an attorney or a
CASA volunteer. The most financially sustainable model would be to make the
best-interests advocate a CASA volunteer, since many states already have wellestablished CASA programs289 that could continue to operate within the
framework of the Model Act, so long as they are not the child’s only form of
representation. Thus, under most states’ current systems, appointment of a
separate best-interests advocate will not cost the state additional funding.
Moreover, granting children in foster care the autonomy to make reasoned
decisions relating to their own care and providing them a voice throughout legal
proceedings would help engender a sense of dignity and agency in the child, 290
and would provide the child with much-needed continuity throughout the foster
care process.291 The child’s own involvement in decision-making would likely
make the child more readily able to accept the decisions made as the result of a
fair and justiciable process.292 As such, the state might actually save costs down
the line as a result of better outcomes in foster children’s care and their
subsequent transition into society.293 These delayed cost-saving opportunities

288

42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii).
Currently, there are CASA programs in forty-nine states and the District of Columbia with over 85,000
individuals serving as CASA’s in almost 1,000 programs nationwide. Court Appointed Special
Advocate/Guardian Ad Litem: Frequently Asked Questions, CT. APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOC.: FOR CHILD.,
https://casakids.net/faq/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2022). These CASAs serve over 260,000 children nationwide in
abuse and neglect proceedings. Id.
290 Barnett, supra note 108, at 267 (discussing the role of self-regulation skills through the practice of
decision-making in forming adolescent autonomy).
291 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN
ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES, supra note 260, at § D-13 cmt.
292
ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILD. IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY
PROCEEDINGS 21 (AM. BAR ASS’ N 2011); Adams, Rosado & Vigil, supra note 236, at 34 (“A child who knows
that his or her voice has been heard will more easily live with whatever result is ultimately achieved . . . .”
(internal citations omitted)).
293 For instance, one report shows over 45% of former foster children reported receiving food stamps two
to three years after aging out of foster care. A CHILD’ S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, supra note 256, at 4–5. In the 2020
fiscal year, the government spent “$85.6 billion on the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program.” Tracy
Roof, SNAP Benefits Cost a Total of $85.6B in the 2020 Fiscal Year Amid Heightened U.S. Poverty and
Unemployment, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 27, 2020, 8:11 AM), https://theconversation.com/snap-benefits-costa-total-of-85-6b-in-the-2020-fiscal-year-amid-heightened-us-poverty-and-unemployment-148077.
289
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will render this Comment’s solution more attractive to states holding tight to
their purse strings.
Second, some critics may object to the proposed solution by claiming that
using the judicial bypass process in this context would effect a drain on judicial
resources. However, while this solution does propose that the judiciary take a
more active role in some facets of the foster child’s care, the foster child seeking
a judicial bypass might not always end up in the courtroom. For instance, the
attorney and child may be able to sit down with the caseworker or foster parent
and settle294 these issues without involving the judge. In such scenarios, the mere
prospect of defending their position before a judge might make the caseworker
or foster parent more amenable to the child’s request, and the presence of the
attorney would help the child advocate their position more skillfully.
Furthermore, the attorney—in their role as counselor to the child—would
provide an additional, and ideally trusted,295 figure with whom the child could
reason through their wishes, and perhaps the child would accept the decisions
made by the child’s caretaker or caseworker without needing to advocate their
position before a judge.296 In these situations, the judiciary need not be highly
involved since knowledge that the child has an advocate and an opportunity to
plead their case would provide sufficient incentives for both the child and the
caretaker to come to a reasoned consensus without needing the judicial bypass
proceeding.
Third, while some have critiqued the mature minor doctrine for the
subjective nature of its criteria,297 it is worth noting other areas of law have long
applied similarly subjective tests, particularly in the context of criminal law. 298
Furthermore, the mature minor doctrine’s subjectivity serves as a balance to the
rigid, bright-line age of majority, which functions to indiscriminately separate
legal actors from children unable to exercise many autonomous rights.299 Thus,
294 ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILD. IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY
PROCEEDINGS § 7(b)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (“The duties of a child’s lawyer include . . . discussing the
possibility of settlement or the use of alternative forms of dispute resolution and participating in such processes
to the extent permitted under the law of this state.”).
295 See id. § 7(c) (encouraging the child-centered attorney to form a relationship with the child to best
determine the expressed wishes of the child).
296 See Adams, Rosado & Vigil, supra note 236, at 32 (emphasizing the attorney’s duty to counsel the childclient as “the most appropriate course of action” (internal quotations omitted)).
297 See Derish & Heuvel, supra note 134, at 117 (“Reliance upon the common law leaves the mature minor
doctrine highly vulnerable to a wide array of interpretations by state and federal courts.”).
298 Id. at 118 (pointing out that criminal law sometimes applies similar tests of a minor’s maturity to
determine whether a minor should be tried as an adult).
299 Benston, supra note 136, at 14.
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while multifactor tests such as the mature minor doctrine can be difficult to apply
with consistency, such subjectivity also allows for increased flexibility. 300
Finally, some opponents of the proposed solution may fear that granting
greater autonomy to children in foster care poses a threat to the fundamental
parental rights of the child’s legal parent.301 However, it is important to
remember that for the child in foster care, the legal parent is already exercising
reduced parental rights.302 The potential affront to parental autonomy resulting
from granting the foster child increased decision-making authority is mitigated
by the fact that the parent has already either relinquished their parental authority
to some degree or been adjudicated an unfit parent. Thus, such decisions ought
to be made by someone with knowledge about the child’s situation, continuity
throughout the turmoil of foster care placement, and concern for the child’s wellbeing. There is no reason why that figure cannot be the child themselves, if
proven sufficiently mature. Parental rights can return to the status quo when, and
if, the child is reunited with their legal parents.
CONCLUSION
When it comes to the child welfare system, commentators, stakeholders, and
policymakers spend a majority of their time asking what is in the best interests
of the child. Yet—even in the case of older, mature children—time is rarely
taken to ask what decision the child believes furthers their best interests. While
it is correct to assume there are some choices the child should not or cannot
make, this assumption has often been conflated by the law to mean the child can
never decide. This faulty inferential leap fails America’s children.
The child in foster care is frequently left adrift without the tether of parental
connection and is pulled by the tides of siloed decision-makers. The foster child
is often unable to enact their own choices due to the dearth of active rights
granted to children by the Supreme Court, and the failure of federal and state
legislatures to recognize the child themselves as an autonomous individual.
Further, no federal and only a few state laws provide the child with the explicit

300 Somewhat ironically, the very same flexibility and wide discretion for judges is also what has been the
first response to critics of the best interests of the child standard, since such flexibility allows the standard to be
used in the very factually specific inquiries frequently demanded in the realm of family law. Janet L. Dolgin,
Why Has the Best-Interest Standard Survived?: The Historic and Social Context, 16 CHILD.’S LEGAL RTS. J. 2,
7 (1996).
301 This, of course, would only be a concern if the parent’s rights had not been terminated by the state.
302 See supra Section I.C.
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right to a child-centered attorney, even in abuse and neglect proceedings where
reorganization of the child’s entire familial structure is at stake.303
For the child in foster care, the sad reality is that the child themselves may
be the only continuous individual present throughout various placements,
proceedings, and personal events in the child’s life. State legislatures and courts
must recognize the child’s right to take an active role in their own life and
function as a decision-maker. The state may be required to protect the child
through removal from their home; however, this removal should serve to
empower, rather than silence, the one whom it seeks to defend.
KATIE CHILTON

303

See supra notes 255–256 and accompanying text.
I am immensely grateful to my faculty advisor, Professor John Witte, whose kind encouragement and
thoughtful feedback propelled me forward throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank the editorial
staff of Emory Law Journal, particularly Bess Greenberg, Melissa Murphy, and Everett Stanley, whose diligent
editing and insightful feedback improved this piece tenfold. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Mark and
Susan Chilton, and my grandfather, John Lytle, who each inspired this work in their own way.


